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Civil procedure serves a multitude of goals, from regulating the cost of fact
gathering to dictating the rules of advocacy in court to promoting public participation in trials. To what extent can procedural design serve them all, or must rules
sacrifice some interests to serve others? In this Article, we are the first to introduce a
theory of procedural design that answers this question. We build upon the fundamental insight that the goals of civil procedure, as varied as they are, all occupy a
common conceptual space—each addresses an externality, positive or negative, that
litigation creates. This insight allows us to tie together distinct strands of scholarship on procedural design, develop a taxonomy of externalities that civil procedure
addresses, and propose (sometimes radical) reforms that would allow procedure to
serve more of its goals at once.
First, we show that the literature on procedural design has unraveled into
three distinct strands. The first strand centers on the interest in reducing cost and
delay in litigation. The second strand centers on the interests in limiting gamesmanship between the parties and improving court accuracy in decision-making. The
third strand centers on the many related interests in the positive effects of procedure
on society, such as developing legal precedent, deterring unwanted (primary) behavior, and so on.
Second, we tie together these strands of the literature by observing that each
strand is focused on how procedure can address one type of externality. The first
strand of the literature addresses what we call “system externalities”—the effects of
actions on other cases in the same court or court system. The second strand addresses
what we call “strategic externalities”—the effects of a party’s actions on opposing
parties in the same case. The third strand implicates external effects on society as a
whole, which we call “public-goods externalities.”
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Third, and most ambitiously, we show that these three types of externalities
give us a three-dimensional framework for procedural design. In this framework,
we see how different aspects of procedure implicate one or another externality, or
two or three at once. This, in turn, points the way toward opportunities to introduce
procedural reforms tailored to types of externalities at issue. Our solutions range
from surprising forms of judicial command and control (for example, the Supreme
Court prohibiting parties from settling) to fees and subsidies (for example, a fund
for judicially appointed neutral experts in important cases) to radical market-based
reforms (for example, a cap-and-trade market in word limits for amicus briefs in
the Supreme Court).
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INTRODUCTION
What is civil procedure for? Scholars have long debated the
goals of the civil procedure system.1 Many interests spring to
mind: facilitating fast and low-cost dispute resolution, enabling
truth seeking at trial, tamping down gamesmanship and oppressive behavior between disputants, deterring unwanted (primary)
behavior by potential defendants, facilitating the development of
legal precedent, providing a public forum to aggrieved parties, increasing government transparency, encouraging democratic participation (through civil juries), and strengthening courts’ legitimacy as an organ of the coercive power of the state.
It is uncontroversial that these interests both should and do
motivate the design of civil procedure. But the proliferation of
these undergirding interests presents two fundamental questions. First, which procedures actually advance any of these interests? Second, how can a coherent system of procedure accommodate multiple interests when they conflict?
For many specific procedural-design choices, answering the
first question answers the second because interests align. For example, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules)
abolished the forms of action in 1938, this simplification of procedure reduced both the costs of pleading and opportunities for
gamesmanship.2 As another example, the norm that judges publicly announce major decisions in written orders both generates
legal precedent and makes outcomes of court proceedings more
transparent. And some specific design choices may serve one interest in isolation, with no adverse effect on other interests. That
judges sit on elevated benches or wear black robes may reinforce
the (perceived) legitimacy of the court, but those practices seem
neutral with respect to other goals for civil litigation.
For many other aspects of procedure, answering these fundamental questions is not easy. For example, jury trials in civil cases
can foster democratic participation in government processes,3 and
1
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1333–34 nn.21–22 (2012).
2
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits.”).
3
See generally Valerie P. Hans, John Gastil & Traci Feller, Deliberative Democracy
and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697 (2014). But see George L.
Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
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broad, party-driven discovery seeks to uncover the facts of underlying substantive claims.4 But both inflate the cost of civil litigation and multiply opportunities for gamesmanship.5 Thus, even if
there is agreement about the descriptive question of which procedures promote which interests, there remains the normative
question of how to select among design choices, each of which
serves some values but disserves others. In these circumstances,
debates about procedure seem to reduce to debates over whether
to weigh some values more and other values less. Yet debates over
first principles may be intractable.
Perhaps as a consequence, the literature on procedural design has unraveled into three distinct strands, each focusing on a
particular subset of the values underlying civil procedure. The
first contribution of this Article is to recognize this division in the
literature—a taxonomy that we will argue will be useful in constructing a framework to bring the literature back together again.
We introduce this basic taxonomy in Part I. The first strand,
which has been a primary focus of judicial attention in recent
years, centers on the interest in reducing cost and delay in litigation.6 The second strand, which has been the primary focus of a
theoretical law-and-economics literature, centers on the interests
in limiting gamesmanship between the parties and improving
court accuracy in decision-making.7 The third strand, which represents by far the largest share of the academic literature, centers
on various positive effects of procedure on society: the development of legal precedent, the public resolution of disputes of social
significance, the deterrence of unwanted (primary) behavior, the

161, 184–86 (“The role of the civil jury as a democratic counterforce in cases implicating
governmental power was trivial . . . suggesting that the occasions upon which civil juries
are actually employed in a political role are very limited in our society.”).
4
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
5
See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357–58 (D. Md.
2008) (asserting the importance of cooperation in discovery but lamenting gamesmanship
between parties); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39
(1989); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1991) (addressing the
use of peremptory strikes in voir dire on the basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 131–35 (1994) (addressing the use of peremptory strikes in voir dire on the
basis of sex); Martin Van der Linden, Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection
Procedures, 61 J.L. & ECON. 711, 711 (2018).
6
See infra Part I.A.
7
See infra Part I.B.
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transparent and legitimate exercise of government power, and
democratic participation in the legal system.8
What is missing is a framework for reconciling potentially divergent interests when making choices about procedural design.
Without such a framework, it is easy to assume that a proceduraldesign choice boils down to the question of prioritizing one value
over another. For example, if we care more about reducing congestion in courts, we should encourage litigants to settle; but if
we care more about producing precedents that will benefit society
at large, we should do the opposite.
But are such trade-offs between interests inevitable? For rule
makers, does the choice between one option and another boil
down to a judgment about which interests to promote and which
to sacrifice? In this Article, we argue that the answer is no. Rather, good procedural design seeks solutions that can simultaneously serve multiple interests. But there exists no conceptual
framework to facilitate the search for such solutions.
Our goal in this Article is to develop a theory of procedural
design that provides this framework. We begin by tying together
the three strands of the procedural design literature. Part II presents this Article’s first key insight, which is that each strand of
the literature focuses on one type of externality. The concerns
that animate civil procedure—from reducing cost and delay to
promoting fair play and transparency to preserving the legitimacy of the courts—can all be understood as different types of
positive and negative externalities.
Consider again the example of going to trial rather than settling. An individual party asks whether a trial improves the expected value of the suit (relative to settlement) and whether this
improvement exceeds the expected costs. Missing from this calculation are the effects of the action on everyone else: the costs of
trial to the opponent, the court, and the witnesses; the opportunity for civil participation through jury trial; the chance for a
judicial order and appellate review that would generate legal
precedent; or—what law-and-economics-oriented scholars will
consider most important of all—the deterrence of socially undesirable (primary) behavior. All these costs and benefits of going to
trial are “external” to the party’s cost-benefit calculation. They
are, in a word, externalities.

8

See infra Part I.C.
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In the first strand of the literature, the interest in reducing
cost and delay implicates external effects on other cases in the
same court or court system. We call these external effects “system
externalities.” The problem in this context is that parties are
thinking about their own cases but not other cases in the same
court. (Analogies from other contexts include polluters not taking
into account their effects on neighbors and drivers on a congested
road not taking into account their contributions to other drivers’
delays.)
In the second strand, the interests in avoiding the use of procedure as a cudgel implicate external effects on opposing parties
in the same case. We call these external effects “strategic externalities.” Here, the problem is not that parties are oblivious to
their effect on other cases but the inverse: they are too keenly
aware of the effects of their procedural moves on their own case.
(An analogy outside the procedure context would be to a monopolist lobbying for expensive and unnecessary regulation so that potential competitors cannot afford to enter the industry. This is
profit maximizing for the monopolist but costly and wasteful for
competitors and consumers.)
And in the third strand, the numerous interests in legitimacy, norm creation, deterrence, democratic participation, and so
on implicate external effects on society as a whole. We call these
external effects “public-goods externalities.” (An analogy might be
to scientific innovation or artistic creation that generates ideas
that others can freely copy.)
Regardless of the precise type of externality, all prescriptions
for improving outcomes when faced with an externality boil down
to the same essence: implement a policy that ensures that the
party creating the externality will “internalize” the externality or,
barring that, impose command-and-control regulation (i.e., mandates or prohibitions) to better align behavior that fails to account
for the externality. If it is a negative externality, that means that
actors must bear the costs that they are imposing on others. If it
is a positive externality, then actors must gain the benefits that
they are conferring on others. When both types of externalities
occur simultaneously, actors might be required to bear some costs
while gaining some benefits.
The externalities framework equips us with a single, unifying
principle to guide judgments about procedural design. A key idea
that we develop in this Article is that the interests at stake in
each strand of the literature are not inherently opposed. Rather,
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they each represent different “dimensions” of externalities—more
of one externality doesn’t necessarily mean less of the others.
This means that procedural-design choices do not necessarily
have to trade off one externality against another (for example, reductions in court congestion need not come at a cost of reduced
public goods). Some design choices can improve the status quo
along one dimension without compromising on other dimensions.
In this way, procedural design can point toward positive-sum reforms, regardless of the values at stake.
Part III introduces this Article’s second and more important
main insight—how procedure attempts to regulate externalities
is intimately bound up with how procedure allocates discretion
and flexibility among participants in the system. Not all cases are
alike, and thus not all cases generate the same types or amount
of externalities. Yet it is impossible for rule makers to write procedural rules perfectly tailored to each individual case. Thus,
when rule makers create a system of procedural rules tailored to
the typical case, recognizing that a one-size-fits-all system will
create inefficiencies, they build procedural flexibility into the system. By giving judges or even the parties themselves discretion to
modify the defaults in the rules, a well-designed system grants
flexibility that better tailors procedure to the idiosyncratic needs
of individual cases.
But modifications to procedural defaults (either by parties or
by the judge) carry with them not only potential benefits but also
potential costs. As noted above, the interests that procedural design tries to promote all involve some form of externality. What
this means is that parties or even judges who exercise flexibility
based on their own sense of what is best for them will not necessarily make choices that align with what is best for everyone—
i.e., what promotes positive externalities (like civic participation)
and suppresses negative externalities (like court congestion).
Thus, any normative theory of civil procedure must account for
when, how, and to whom rule makers should give discretion to
deviate from the default rules.
This, in turn, requires an understanding of what options rule
makers have for adding flexibility to procedure. Fortunately,
there is already a well-developed literature on procedural flexibility. The simplest approach to procedural flexibility is to conceptualize it as a binary, on/off decision about whether parties can
modify the default civil procedure rules. Flexibility means that
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parties, through mutual agreement, can opt out of procedural defaults. Lack of flexibility means that procedures are fixed by rule
or at least subject to modification only by the judge.
Procedural flexibility takes many forms, not all of which had
previously been widely recognized.9 In earlier work, we showed in
detail how civil procedure spans a spectrum of forms of flexibility
involving varying amounts of discretion by parties, judges, or
both.10 We observed that rules sometimes allow a single party to
unilaterally opt into or out of a default, and sometimes rules require agreement among the parties and the judge. More provocatively, we went beyond discussing bargaining over civil procedure
rights between participants in a single case by considering trading, buying, or selling procedures across cases. We argued that
courts could—and sometimes already do!—allocate things like
jury trials, class-counsel assignments, and access to mass settlements through mechanisms not unlike barters, auctions, or
prices. After all, procedure can be understood as a set of rules for
allocating entitlements (to file motions, to obtain discovery, to
conduct a jury trial, to appeal a judgment) to parties. Markets,
auctions, user fees, Pigouvian taxes, and subsidies are all familiar
(and often highly effective) methods of allocating entitlements to
serve various societal objectives.
Recognizing this descriptive reality, in Part IV we take up the
normative question of what kinds of procedural flexibility are optimal—in other words, if there is a spectrum of procedural flexibility,
where on that spectrum should any given type of procedure be?
To this end, our first insight (that three types of externalities
motivate procedural design) informs our second (that flexibility is
a key tool for procedural design due to its ability to make parties
internalize the harms and benefits they cause third parties).
Indeed, more than a hundred years of economics literature has
explored how mechanisms for allocating entitlements (barter,

9
Sometimes procedure is inflexible—there is a rule, and no one in any given case
can change it. The best-known inflexible rules are probably those governing the subject
matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Sometimes the judge has discretion to apply the rule or
not to apply it. For example, a judge may grant (or not) a new trial after a jury verdict,
and this is within the judge’s discretion and may be done with or without motion from a
party. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(d). Other times the rule is merely a default rule that explicitly
allows the parties to agree to a different rule. For example, parties have broad discretion
to modify default limits on discovery by mutual agreement. FED. R. CIV. P. 29. For a review
of the literature on procedural flexibility, see Ronen Avraham & William H.J. Hubbard,
The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 901–10 (2020).
10 See Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 901–10.
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cap-and-trade, auctions, Pigouvian taxes, subsidies) can be used
to regulate externalities, such as pollution or road congestion.11 It
is evident that not all externalities require the same remedies.
We will argue that, for some types of procedure, court-regulated
markets may improve upon the status quo, but we reject the idea
that markets or flexibility are desirable in general.
To be more specific, each strand of the existing literature corresponds to a bundle of externalities that imposes costs and benefits on a different group, and thus we tailor our proposals accordingly. The first strand deals with cost, delay, congestion—what
we’re calling “system externalities.” Once framed in this way, we
think that it becomes clear that the right approach to reducing
these externalities is to make parties take account of the costs
that their choices impose on the court system. We call this the
“internalization solution”—unlinking the parties from their specific case so that they bear the costs of delay felt by the whole
system. (The analogy here is to a tax on, or a cap-and-trade system for, carbon emissions.) Many times, the best mechanisms to
address system externalities are market solutions.
To take a simple example, consider all the rules and motion
practice devoted to page limits for briefs and time limits for hearings. One might imagine a novel way to approach this problem,
such as cap-and-trade mechanisms. Such a system for pages and
minutes would require parties who want to exceed their default
number of pages or minutes to buy credits for those excess
amounts from other parties (in the same case or in other cases)
who will use less than the default amount. Such a change would
doubly improve the use of courts’ time hearing motions and reading briefs. First, parties would be more likely to forgo borderline
arguments since they now need to pay for the time and space to
make them. Second, courts wouldn’t have to spend their time
hearing and deciding motions for extensions of page limits or additional hearing dates. That time and space would be allocated
through supply and demand rather than costly command-andcontrol judicial deliberation.
The second strand deals with the social waste from gamesmanship—what we’re calling “strategic externalities.” Here, we
want to bind the fates of the parties more tightly together. We call
this the “tethering” solution—linking a party’s own payoffs to the

11

Cf. infra Part IV.A.
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payoffs of their opponent. For example, if our concern is about sophisticated lawyers using broad discovery requests to impose
costs on their opponents, one solution may be cost sharing, in
which each party pays part of the other party’s costs of responding
to discovery. (The analogy here would be to a rule requiring the
monopolist to pay for any lobbying by competitors up to the
amount that the monopolist spent on lobbying.)
The third strand collects interests in legitimacy, norm creation, deterrence, democratic participation, and so on—what we’re
calling “public-goods externalities.” Here, we think that the obvious approach is simply to subsidize or mandate the relevant conduct. Notably, this is already the case in practice to some degree.
As an example, in socially important cases that could produce
major precedents, the judicial system should encourage and perhaps even subsidize the costs that parties have to bear in order
for the court to hear expert witnesses who may aid the court in
reaching a more accurate decision. (An analogy here is to government grants in support of science and the arts.) To be clear, we do
not take a position on which interests or values should or should
not be given higher priority. We take as given the values identified in the extant literature and seek to build our proposals upon
them.
Having constructed the normative framework, we then turn
in Part V to the question of potential policy prescriptions. Lawyers and economists have long studied a range of policies that can
regulate externalities in ways that alleviate their harms (or capture their benefits) with the fewest side effects. Once we recognize
that procedure regulates externalities, we can import proven regulatory policies from other domains. These policies include relatively familiar regulatory moves (such as taxes, fees, and subsidies) and more exotic moves (such as auctions and tradable
credits for procedural entitlements).
For example, no subject within civil procedure currently
raises more questions about rulemaking and procedural design
than multidistrict litigation (MDL). In the course of managing
sprawling consolidated pretrial proceedings in hundreds or thousands of distinct cases, MDL judges—in concert with enterprising
plaintiff-side and defense-side attorneys—have aggressively innovated with procedures, leading one pair of commentators to describe MDLs as “something of a cross between the Wild West,
twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather
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movies.”12 Observers have begun to lament the costs—in the currencies of transparency, norm creation, accountability, and legitimacy—of the sweepingly discretionary and unsupervised power
of MDL judges.13 Yet it is hard to deny that the rise of MDLs has
leveraged the benefits—in terms of cost, speed, and access to justice—of massive case aggregation.14 Procedural flexibility in
MDLs has reached the point that, as a practical matter, important features of individual case control (such as attorney representation, pleading, discovery, and even trial) are reallocated
across cases.15 How should we trade off the benefits of flexibility
afforded in MDLs with the benefits of formality afforded by more
uniformly applied rules—or is there a trade-off at all? Can we
have both? As we explain in Part V, we see MDLs as implicating
system externalities (and potentially strategic externalities) that
are best addressed through market-based allocation mechanisms.
These mechanisms make feasible an approach to MDL procedure
that offers, on the one hand, greater transparency and accountability than the existing regime of ad hoc discretion and bargaining
and, on the other hand, further improvements in the efficiency of
case management of aggregate litigation.
As we seek to show in this Article, our framework can help
both courts at the local level and policy makers at the more global
level improve the performance of the legal ecosystem. Courts or
even individual judges can benefit from the simple framework of
thinking about the three types of externalities generated by procedure when they assess how, when, and which motions, requests, and parties’ agreements should be accommodated by the
law. And our framework can guide courts and policy makers in
interpreting the current rules of civil procedure on questions of
judicial control versus flexibility.

12 Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation,
Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015).
13 E.g., id. at 140–42; Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1669, 1687–91 (2017); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 78–84 (2015); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2021) (“MDL’s particular mode of centralization—from its anti-federalist stance to its insistence that each proceeding is too unique to
be confined by the transsubstantive Federal Rules—chafes at almost every aspect of procedure’s traditional rules and values.”).
14 Jay Tidmarsh & Daniela Peinado Welsh, The Future of Multidistrict Litigation, 51
CONN. L. REV. 769, 789 (2019) (“Multidistrict litigation resolves transferred cases at a
fraction of the cost of individual litigation.”).
15 Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 936–42.
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To be sure, individual judges (who see and attempt to control
strategic externalities in everyday litigation) are not necessarily
well positioned to deal with system externalities or public-goods
externalities. But court administrators and chief judges could
nonetheless implement policies, through local rules, that address
these externalities in a more self-aware and deliberate way. Examples might include rules requiring a party to compensate the
other party for motions that generate strategic externalities (such
as extra discovery requests) or rules replacing a single filing fee
at the outset of a case with à la carte court fees for individual
motions that contribute to system externalities (such as motions
for extensions, for extra brief pages, and the like).
At the more global level, our framework can help legislatures
design novel reforms that can reduce litigation cost, increase tailoring of procedure to parties’ needs, reduce court congestion, and
improve the various positive outcomes the law can generate, such
as deterrence and distributional equity. By broadening our design
choices, which include novel bottom-up, market-based solutions,
we can identify opportunities for win-win reforms that improve
one externality without necessarily worsening any other externalities. For example, our framework can help legislators implement more ambitious and complex possibilities, such as tradable
credits for procedure; it can inform them on how and when to establish administrative compensation schemes to combat system
externalities; and it can guide them on how to reform the Federal
Arbitration Act16 (FAA) to better sort which cases should stay in
the legal system and which cases should be systematically channeled out.
Importantly, our framework provides an analytical tool for
studying the entire ecosystem of dispute resolution, not just court
procedure. When we discuss our framework, our examples include
forms of dispute resolution beyond courts, such as compensation
funds and arbitration. Our framework works both at the interand intraprocedural levels: it can be used to compare procedural
systems, not just to evaluate procedures within any given system.
We therefore hope to impact both global reforms implemented by
state or federal governments as well as local reforms implemented by judges or chief judges.

16 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 9 U.S.C.).
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW: THREE STRANDS
As mentioned, the literature on procedural design has split
into three separate strands that focus on different values underlying civil procedure.
A. Cost and Delay
The first strand focuses on the interest in reducing cost and
delay and its concomitant benefits for access to justice. Scholarship in this area tends to focus on court congestion and efficiencies from aggregation.17 This literature, written by both scholars
and judges, explores procedures that have been developed to enable courts to respond to docket pressure through large-scale consolidation of cases (such as through the MDL process), greater judicial assertiveness in pushing cases toward settlement or bench
trials rather than jury trials, and greater use of procedural devices
such as summary judgment.18 It also deals with, for example, how
judges should respond to requests that would increase court congestion and taxpayer expense.19
B. Gamesmanship
The second strand focuses on the interest in suppressing
gamesmanship and its concomitant distortion of the truth-seeking
function of procedure. This literature builds on the basic premise

17 For literature on court congestion, see generally, for example, Victor Marrero, The
Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016); George L. Priest, Private
Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527 (1989). But see Danya
Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and
Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1102–11 (2012) (using empirical data to argue that litigation is not excessively costly or slow).
18 See generally Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgement Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Thoughts About Professor
Resnik’s Paper, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2197 (2000); Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design,
71 VAND. L. REV. 821 (2018). For suggestions for how to reduce court congestion, see generally, for example, Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165;
Michael L. Seigel, Pragmatism Applied: Imagining a Solution to the Problem of Court Congestion, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567 (1994); Julius H. Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265 (1959).
19 See generally Bone, supra note 1; Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The
Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007). Professor
George Priest observed that changes to procedure or judicial management meant to reduce
delay will disincentivize rapid settlement. This observation indirectly connects concerns
about cost and delay with the strategic externalities that we discuss next. Priest, supra
note 17, at 557.
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that parties are adversaries and therefore have incentives to impose superfluous costs on each other (like threatening to go to
trial) in order to gain strategic advantage.20 For example, part of
this literature examines whether plaintiffs can extract settlements from defendants even when their claims have little or no
merit.21 Much of the literature centers on cost allocation during
discovery.22 Professors Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld, for
instance, advocate cost shifting to reduce discovery abuse without
arbitrarily limiting open-ended discovery,23 and Professor Martin
Redish advocates cost-shifting to handle e-discovery’s unique
costs and opportunities for gamesmanship.24 Professors H. Allen
Blair and W. Mark Weidemaier both find that, although many
parties choose not to contract about procedure with each other,
there are large potential gains to be realized with private control.25 Other literature focuses on the role of judges and procedural rules in controlling parties’ strategic behavior26 and specifically on limiting strategic flexibility—such as banning
settlements in class actions27—or even, as Professor Owen Fiss

20 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand
Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990). Parties can even intentionally create externalities to increase their bargaining power in settlement negotiations. See Daniel B. Kelly,
Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1649–53 (2011).
21 See generally William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement,
32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 545 (2016). See also Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal
Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 979 (1998) (“[P]arties
settle lawsuits based on tactics and expenses as much as—if not more than—their predictions of how a judge would apply law to fact.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1996)
(“Whether the plaintiff has a credible threat or not depends . . . on the relationship between the following parameters: the expected judgment, the plaintiff’s litigation costs, the
defendant’s litigation costs, and the way in which the parties’ costs are spread throughout
the litigation process.”).
22 See generally Benjamin Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil Discovery,
34 REV. LITIG. 769 (2015); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future:
Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011).
23 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 458–59 (1994).
24 Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 608–15 (2001).
25 H. Allen Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating
Procedure Through Contract, 95 NEB. L. REV. 787, 802–13 (2017); W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1875–81 (2015).
26 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1996–2001 (2007); Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System?
Maybe It’s the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 199, 214–21 (1994).
27 See generally David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance
Suits: The Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42 (2006).
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advocates, discouraging settlements in all litigation.28 We build
on these insights, which show the power of procedural flexibility
(or inflexibility) to regulate the externalities generated by litigation. While these earlier works emphasize the benefits of restraining flexibility for the parties, one of the benefits of our theory is
that it reveals the counterintuitive idea that procedure can control
strategic behavior by expanding procedural options for parties.
C. Societal Values
The third strand focuses on a bundle of interests related to
the effect of the court system on society, such as norm creation
through precedent and legitimation of the court system.29 This literature addresses the allocation of discretion between the judge
and the parties to a case, and its object is to identify the optimal
scope of private contracting over the state-provided default procedure.30 This literature treats civil procedure as a top-down system
that identifies the set of procedures that cannot be altered by parties. These are the aspects of procedure that are central to the role

28 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See also
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2642–
47 (1995) (expanding on and offering a critical view of Fiss’s Against Settlement).
29 See Bone, supra note 1, at 1378–80.
30 For some of the literature on the social costs of privatized procedure, see generally
David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985 (2017); Richard D. Freer,
Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491 (2016);
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); Judith Resnik, Uncovering,
Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at
Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521 (2006). See also Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural
Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 729 (2011):

[T]he rise of ex ante procedural contracts permit[ting] parties to adjust substantive obligations and expected liability . . . has the capacity to reshape not only
the role of the private right of action between contracting parties but also the
broad swath of statutory, constitutional, and common law obligations that rely
upon it as a primary mechanism of enforcement.
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that courts play in society through dispute resolution, norm creation,31 democratic participation,32 court legitimacy,33 distributive
justice, and optimal deterrence incentives for future parties.34
II. UNIFYING PRINCIPLE: PROCEDURAL VALUES AS
EXTERNALITIES, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
Professor Steve Shavell famously exposed the fundamental
divergence between the private and social motives to use the legal
system by identifying the negative and positive externalities involved in the decision to bring a lawsuit.35 Because private parties
are primarily concerned with their self-centered benefits and
costs when dealing with the legal system, they ignore costs and
benefits that they impose on their counterparties and the legal
system as a whole. Yet this does not mean that judges are necessarily better positioned than parties to exercise choices in litigation. Judicial decisions, too, have external effects far beyond a
judge’s own courtroom or docket.
Building upon Shavell’s work, we start this Part by identifying three different types of externalities: system externalities,
strategic externalities, and public-goods externalities. These
three types of externalities match the three types of costs discussed above. We then explicate how these externalities can help
us understand civil procedural design and help us develop new
solutions to old problems.

31 See generally Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65
UCLA L. REV. 808 (2018).
32 See generally Hans et al., supra note 3.
33 See generally Daniel S. Nagin & Cody W. Telep, Procedural Justice and Legal
Compliance, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 5 (2017); Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy
and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (2012); Pamela K. Bookman & David
L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017).
34 See generally Bone, supra note 1; Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing
the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1475 (2013); Moffitt, supra note 19; Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994) (arguing that accuracy is a public good since
it increases deterrence).
35 Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 581–86 (1997).
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A. System Externalities
There are three types of negative external social costs associated with running a legal system that fall under the rubric of system externalities: “Congestion costs” are costs that an action imposes on the court docket (and therefore the judge and other
litigants). An intuitive example involves a court scheduling an additional hearing. Even if both parties agree that more hearing
time is desirable, the new hearing affects the court’s docket and
delays hearings in every other case. Not surprisingly given the
effect on the court’s docket, the judge’s approval is required, but
we will argue that requiring judicial approval is not the only way
to control congestion costs.
“Spillover costs” are costs that parties or judges impose on
other courts. This includes when the action is transferred or removed to a different court in the same jurisdiction, a different jurisdiction, or even from a state court to a federal one. Whereas
trial judges might be pretty good at controlling their own congestion costs, they do not have the same incentive to control spillover
costs. In the example above of a request for an additional hearing,
the judge internalizes at least part of the external costs associated
with congestion in their docket, whereas in a request to transfer
a case to another court, the judge does not suffer the spillover
costs on other courts. The framework we develop shows how spillover costs can be better controlled.
“Third-party costs” are the costs imposed on third parties,
such as witnesses. Since witnesses (other than expert witnesses)
are not compensated for their time, there are no optimal incentives to avoid overburdening them. A simple solution might be to
compensate the witnesses for their time, but if that raises concerns with access to justice or the like, other means of correcting
this externality should be considered. As we shall show, our
framework will demonstrate new ways to control third-party
costs.
B. Strategic Externalities
Strategic externalities are externalities that parties impose
on each other. When a party requests a deposition of the other
party or requests a broad range of documents, this serves the goal
of gathering evidence in the case, but every increment of discovery also increases costs for the other party. And for some types of
requests, the costs fall asymmetrically on the responding party.
Given that parties are adversaries, one would predict that parties
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would attempt to impose costs on their opponents to push them
toward a favorable settlement. Similarly, parties might refuse to
reduce costs (e.g., not stipulating to fewer depositions) just to
make litigation too expensive for the other side.
Sometimes judges can control this strategic externality.
Other times, parties can solve this problem by agreement if they
find a mutually advantageous way to allocate costs between
themselves. Yet bargaining might be very expensive or might fail
entirely. As we shall show, our theoretical framework opens up
new ways to control strategic externalities.
C. Public-Goods Externalities
Public-goods externalities include the unique contributions to
the common good of litigations and trials over other forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration. Litigation not only resolves
disputes, but also fosters public values: norm creation, democratic
participation, court legitimacy, and optimal deterrence incentives
for future parties. We do not debate the relative significance of
each of these aspects. We simply bundle them under the rubric of
public-goods externalities because these are all contributions that
the court system makes to the common good beyond the private
benefits it provides to parties. In other words, these benefits of
litigation are a positive externality because parties in a civil action bear most of the costs of creating these benefits (for example,
legal research and argument) while capturing only their pro rata
share of the benefits to the system as a whole.36
The civil justice system has several features that address litigation’s public-goods externalities by incentivizing lawyers to
bring cases: subsidized court fees, enforceability of contingency fee
contracts, one-way fee shifting in favor of plaintiffs, and courtawarded fees to class counsel in class action settlements.37 Yet any
time that a judge or the parties agree to forgo full-blown litigation—most obviously, by settling—they save time and expense for
themselves but reduce the positive externalities generated by litigation and trial. As we shall show, our theoretical framework identifies new possibilities for promoting public-goods externalities.

36 See Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs
of Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267, 274–76 (1985).
37 Of course, these measures are often crude and are not necessarily tailored to the
value of the public goods created.
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***
Now that these externalities have been identified, our theoretical framework helps crystalize how they work in tandem by
making the various trade-offs explicit. It then enables us to innovate with procedural design.
III. PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY AS A TOOL FOR PROCEDURAL
DESIGN
A. The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility
In a recent article, we introduced the spectrum of procedural
flexibility—a tool to visualize the range of ways in which procedural rules do (or don’t) permit participants in litigation to modify
the rules, either by unilateral decision, mutual agreement, or
some other transaction.38 The spectrum will be essential to our
analysis herein, as it will be the main tool with which we will introduce novel ways to solve difficulties and dilemmas that
plagued legal procedure for decades. We thus begin this part by
exploring the full length of the spectrum.
Figure 1 illustrates the different ways that control over flexibility can be allocated among the judge and parties in any given
case. Moving left on the line moves one toward more command
and control by the judge while moving right on the line takes one
toward more freedom allotted to parties to modify the default civil
procedure rules. While most academic and judicial discussions of
procedural flexibility focus on the role of party agreement and judicial discretion, these are only a subset of the forms of flexibility
that one encounters (or might encounter).
FIGURE 1: A SPECTRUM OF CONTROL AMONG JUDGE AND PARTIES
Judge Control
Default
Rules
Apply

Judge & 2 Parties

Judge & 1 Party

1 Party Control

2 Parties’ Agreement

Modification
Allowed

Figure 2 builds on Figure 1 and presents the full spectrum of
procedural flexibility, which incorporates payments (fees, subsidies, and transfers) for exercising flexibility. Sometimes parties
may act unilaterally—but only upon paying a fee to the court or
38

Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 900–10.
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compensating the other party (for ease of presentation we sometimes do not distinguish between them and call both fees and compensation “payments”). Other times unilateral action is subsidized.39 More exotic is the idea that fees (or subsidies) might be
imposed in addition to a requirement that the parties reach agreement to alter a default or in addition to seeking judicial approval.
Even more exotic is the idea that parties do not have to trade their
civil procedure rights in barter but rather can use money payments to smooth transactions.40 For example, we can imagine that
for some procedures, the law could allow a party to unilaterally
deviate from the default only so long as it fully compensates the
other party (and, if appropriate, the court) for the burden it imposes on them. Rather than negotiating an agreement to flex procedure, a party unilaterally flexes the procedure but pays for doing so. Thus, for example, a plaintiff may exercise their option to
take more depositions provided that they pay the defendant a predetermined price and the court system a predetermined fee.41
FIGURE 2: FULL SPECTRUM WITH PAYMENTS AS AN OPTION
Judge Control
+ Payment
Default
Rules
Apply

Judge & 2 Parties
+ Payment

Judge & 1 Party
+ Payment

1 Party Control
+ Payment
Markets

2 Parties’ Agreement
+ Payment

Modification
Allowed

Most exotic of all are “market-based” forms of flexibility.
Other forms of flexibility are limited to the participants in a given
case. Default procedures are set on a per-case basis (for example,
each civil action in federal court gives each party an entitlement
to ten depositions and one appeal as a default)42 and allow parties
partial flexibility to negotiate around those defaults (up or down

39 The initiation of a civil action is itself an example of this, insofar as it is within the
discretion of the plaintiff, conditional on paying a fee—but at a cost that is subsidized
relative to the cost of operating the court system. Other examples from current practice
are rare but do exist. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(3) (allowing a party to unilaterally
designate a method of recording a deposition but requiring that party to pay for the method
chosen).
40 Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 918
41 Id. at 916–22.
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i); FED. R. CIV. P. 31(a)(2)(A)(i); FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1).
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from ten depositions, but only down from one appeal).43 A “market” in procedure, in contrast, sets quantities at the system level,
allowing flexibility in procedure across cases. For example, the
federal courts could give every party the entitlement to take two
depositions and make those entitlements fully tradable—parties
that wanted to take more depositions could buy them from parties
who didn’t need to take any, even parties in a different case.
Because the notion of markets in procedural entitlements
may seem radical, even absurd, we discuss how market-based
procedural design might work and why it could be useful in addressing the externalities that procedure attempts to address.44
B. Markets, Prices, and Auctions: Addressing Externalities
Through Procedural Flexibility
The idea of trading procedural entitlements across cases is
utterly alien to civil litigation (and professional legal ethics), but
trading entitlements is familiar in the field of environmentalprotection policy. Pollution is a classic example of a negative system externality: polluters reap the rewards of polluting activity
but bear only a fraction of the costs imposed on the environment.
Cap-and-trade is a celebrated solution for this problem. By capping the quantity of permits to emit a pollutant, the regulatory
system reduces the impact of emissions; by allowing potential polluters to sell their permits, the system rewards producers that
reduce their emissions while forcing high-emissions producers to

43 An interesting case study on the impetus toward flexibility rather than one-sizefits-all, mandatory rules is the federal courts’ treatment of interlocutory appeals. The judicially created collateral order doctrine declares entire categories of district court decisions to be appealable—or not appealable—on an interlocutory basis. In contrast, the statutory provision for interlocutory appeals of most types of district court decisions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), vests discretion in both the district court judge (who can simply decline to enter
the findings required by the statute) and the appellate court in deciding whether to hear
an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the value of tailoring appealability to the features of individual cases in its decisions restricting the application of the collateral order doctrine in favor of alternatives such as § 1292(b): “[R]ulings
adverse to the privilege vary in their significance; some may be momentous, but others
are more mundane. Section 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and appeals from contempt citations facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential attorney-client privilege rulings.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 112 (2009) (rejecting the
application of the collateral order doctrine to decisions denying attorney-client privilege,
and noting that the categorical treatment of all such decisions as collateral orders would
prevent appellate courts from filtering out relatively unimportant appeals).
44 For a recent work that attempts to demystify the idea of markets in procedure, see
generally Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9.
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pay more.45 Cap-and-trade is behind one of the great success stories of environmental regulation, the dramatic reduction of acidrain-causing sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in North America
over a twelve-year period (which was three years ahead of schedule) at a fraction of the projected cost to industry.46
Given the judicial system’s current failure to effectively solve
congestion issues and other manifestations of system externalities, we argue that not only are market-based approaches to procedure a conceptual possibility—they are potentially an attractive possibility. Rather than the Federal Rules setting various
defaults for discovery, forcing judges to rule on all manner of requests for extensions and exceptions to the Rules or relying on
parties agreeing to modify procedure, we could imagine a regime
for allocating procedural entitlements (from page limits to the
right to file an appeal) through market processes. Initial endowments could be distributed either through cap-and-trade (think
greenhouse emission credits) or by auction (think broadband
spectrum). Either way, these endowments would then be freely
tradable on a secondary market. A plaintiff in an antitrust case
could purchase higher page limits for briefing from a defendant
in a tort action. A defendant seeking to conduct additional depositions could buy the rights of another defendant—or from a procedure broker (if such businesses arise), a nonparty who buys
from parties who no longer need their procedural endowment and
finds interested buyers. A party seeking to make a second appeal
might even be able to purchase that right from a party willing to
forgo any appeal. And, to the extent that we are worried about
excessive trading of procedures, the courts could regulate the
market to make purchases more expensive.
Markets are important because they provide a systemic solution for a systemic problem. Indeed, there is a long-standing disconnect in debates about procedural reform. The problems (or alleged problems) that occupy the attention of advocates and policy
makers are things like court congestion, delay, and expense: problems at the systemic level that critics allege burden courts as a
whole,47 deny access to justice to plaintiffs as a class,48 and impose

45 Gabriel Chan, Robert Stavins, Robert Stowe & Richard Sweeney, The SO2 AllowanceTrading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on 20 Years of Policy
Innovation, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 419, 424–26, 431–32 (2012).
46 Id.
47 See Priest, supra note 17, at 544–48.
48 See Marrero, supra note 17, at 1624–25.
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unjustified costs on defendants in general.49 Yet the policy tools
under consideration almost inevitably are tools that operate at
the individual-case level. For example, Federal Rules amendments announce that judges should have more discretion50—or
less discretion51—to manage discovery or regulate party conduct;
that parties should cooperate more;52 or that they should file
fewer motions.53
Of course, such an approach is logical. The court system operates quite literally on a case-by-case basis. Reforms to how individual cases are litigated will, in the aggregate, affect systemic
performance. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental mismatch between means and ends when courts manage procedural flexibility
and attempt to combat systemic problems on a case-by-case basis.
This arises because systemic problems, like court congestion, are
caused by externalities—parties in a given case are doing what is
individually optimal but has negative effects on the judge or parties in other cases. Case-by-case responses to externalities in litigation are doomed to frustration for at least three reasons:
First, and most obviously, addressing a problem like court congestion on a case-by-case basis requires parties and judges to figure
out how to scale back litigation activity to account for the effects of
their case on the overall level of court congestion. It is simply unrealistic to think that parties and judges in individual cases have
the information or motivation to even begin such a calculation.
Second, even though judges are constantly and adversely affected by court congestion, they lack sufficient incentives to reduce it. The effort of a single judge to reduce court congestion is
itself a positive externality; it redounds to the benefit of all, while
the costly effort is borne entirely by the individual judge.
Third, and more subtly, if we are concerned about modifications to procedure having negative effects on the court and third
parties, then judicial oversight of procedure on a case-by-case basis means that judges must consider the systemic effects of procedural flexibility in every case. But judges doing this is itself a burden on the system!

49

See id. at 1605–06.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; FED. R. CIV.
P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
51 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
52 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
53 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
50
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Markets could potentially address some of the misalignments
that arise under current procedure, which relies heavily on mutual agreement by the parties for flexibility in case management
and discovery. First, and most obviously, neither parties nor
courts currently have incentives to adjust their behavior in individual cases to account for adverse effects on court congestion. A
pricing mechanism can account for the systemic cost of congestion
by making parties pay for more procedure. Second, under current
rules, a party that needs to deviate from procedural defaults but
faces an uncooperative, stonewalling opponent cannot turn elsewhere to bargain for more or different procedures. In a market
where procedures are tradable across cases, however, parties will
not be beholden to their (stubborn) opponents. This will reduce
gamesmanship and holdup behavior. Markets replace the bilateral monopoly between the parties with a multiparty, competitive
environment that reduces strategic externalities. Third, and relatedly, under current procedure, the only recourse to a party facing a stonewalling opponent is to seek an order from a court. This
increases the burden on judges and congests courts. With markets, courts would have less need to review procedure-modifying
contracts for one-sidedness or unconscionability. Parties will be
able to obtain their preferred bundle of procedures in a competitive, open market.
Further, although market-based approaches would impose
epistemic challenges on regulators—who would have to assign
prices or set aggregate quantity limits on procedures—we believe
that these challenges can be overcome. In particular, a cap-andtrade approach that sets aggregate quantities creates a lighter
epistemic burden than setting prices or fees for procedures directly (and it may be more politically palatable too). The current
number of appeals or jury trials or depositions is a measurable
quantity. Rule makers need only make judgments about whether
to increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the aggregate, status
quo quantity.
To be sure, any attempt to regulate total quantities or prices
for procedural rights is a fraught undertaking. As noted above,
the normative underpinnings of procedure are highly diverse and
hotly contested, and any attempt at regulation by cap-and-trade
or auction would only sharpen these debates. By focusing on aggregate targets for quantities (such as total numbers of motions) rather than prices, our proposed approaches may invite less controversy than explicit taxes and fees for procedure. But we recognize
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that framing the solution in terms of quantities rather than prices
only goes so far. Still, our view is that normative debates about
the exact justifications and rationales for procedure need not be
resolved in order to implement our proposals. There are likely
many aspects of procedure where some consensus exists. For example, it may be uncontroversial to set lower targets for the aggregate number of motions for reconsideration.54
Of course, our proposals need not reduce aggregate quantities
of procedural entitlements. The move that is least likely to be controversial is to maintain the status quo in the aggregate. Even if
the aggregate cap (of motions, depositions, or whatever) is identical to the status quo, the ability of parties to reallocate procedures
across cases will address the concerns about strategic holdup and
the judicial-decision-making burden noted above.
We recognize that designing markets in procedure would be
an extremely complex task. For example, establishing a cap-andtrade system requires answering the question of how (and, specifically, to whom) to allocate the initial endowments of procedure.
The obvious answer is simply to give everyone who files a lawsuit
a pro rata bundle of procedural entitlements. But conditioning an
endowment of tradable procedural rights on participation in litigation might create incentives to increase activity levels: some
parties might file collusive lawsuits whose only purpose is to obtain and then sell the procedural rights that come with the suit.
We believe that this concern is manageable—after all, filing a
lawsuit is not free, and filing a frivolous suit is sanctionable—but
there are also alternatives to cap-and-trade for creating a market,
such as a “universal endowment of procedural rights.”55
We have shown, in a prior article, that a different way to allocate procedures is by auction. This would treat the capped
amount of procedure not as credits to be allocated to individuals
but as a public resource to be auctioned off. The auction process,
plus a freely trading secondary market, would ensure that procedures would be available to all litigants at prices that would force

54

See Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 929.
By that we mean to endow every citizen with an allocation of procedural rights,
either to use in the event of litigation or to sell. Although this seems far-fetched, our previous
paper noted that one could imagine a world in which well-developed, low-transaction-cost
markets for procedural rights exist such that every person who has no interest in litigation
can cash in their annual, decadal, or even lifetime endowment at an online store. See id.
at 927–28. But this scenario involves a lot of shuffling around of rights among hundreds
of millions of people, most of whom will never directly use the court system.
55
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them to account for their impact on the system as a whole. Accordingly, litigants would purchase the procedure only when it
would be cost justified to do so.56
The auction system avoids the problem of allocating initial
endowments and the possibility of inviting gamesmanship. The
challenge for the auction approach, however, is ensuring that the
distributional effects of the system are progressive rather than
regressive. An auction of procedural entitlements would offer distributional benefits if, for example, the revenue from the auction
permits a reduction in filing fees or improved subsidies for lowincome plaintiffs. Further, as a practical matter, the cases that
demand the greatest share of the courts’ time and involve the
greatest procedural complexity are not cases brought by impecunious plaintiffs—they can’t afford to litigate that way anyway—
but by large corporations and powerful, well-heeled plaintiffs’
firms. As with cap-and-trade, the costs of pricing procedural
rights will be borne by those who can better afford it (and who
already exercise the lion’s share of such rights); unlike cap-andtrade, the auction method does not create a potential incentive to
file bogus suits solely to cash in on the procedural endowments
that come with it.57
In other words, the costs of paying for additional procedure
in a market-based system would be disproportionately borne by
wealthy and sophisticated litigants—the same litigants that consume a disproportionate amount of court time today but who do
not have to pay extra for the extra attention that they receive.
And the revenue raised can be used to subsidize plaintiffs with
few resources or fund claims that serve the public interest. In this
way, market-based solutions to systemic or strategic externalities
can, in turn, provide funding for subsidy-based solutions to publicgoods externalities.58 We explore these possibilities below as we
elaborate on how procedural flexibility can address different externalities across different cases and procedures.

56

Id. at 928–29.
One could also imagine that it would facilitate the development of procedural brokers, market makers who buy up huge blocks of rights and resell them at the retail level
for litigants as they need them, further reducing the epistemic and transaction costs of
more efficiently allocating procedures to cases. See id. at 928.
58 Id. at 948.
57
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***
The spectrum of procedural flexibility provides a toolkit for
solving the externality problems we have identified. We may slide
along this scale to find the best fit for each case or procedural device, with the goal of identifying the degree of party and judicial
control and the payment mechanism that best addresses the externalities created by those procedures. With this toolkit in hand,
we now turn to our framework for matching the externalities with
the forms of flexibility that best address them.
IV. A THREE-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROCEDURAL
DESIGN
Our most ambitious step is bringing together the three
strands of the literature into a single unified theoretical framework that can produce a new understanding of the legal terrain.
To do this, we leverage the fact that each strand of the literature
corresponds to a focus on a different type of externality, as we
identified in Part II. Our analysis proceeds in three steps.
First, in Part IV.A, we discuss how different forms of procedural flexibility are better suited to address different types of externalities. For example, public-goods externalities are often (but
not always) well suited for command-and-control regulation—i.e.,
rules limiting discretion (if any) to the judge—while system externalities may be amenable to market-based solutions, such as
pay-per-use or even tradable credits for procedures.
Next, in Part IV.B, we construct a three-dimensional graphical model—literally a cube—for visualizing how the three types
of externalities can interact in the context of a particular type of
procedure or type of case. The key idea here is that the interests
at stake in each strand of the literature are not diametrically opposed. Rather, they each represent different dimensions of externalities—more of one externality doesn’t necessarily mean less of
the others. This means that some questions in procedure may not
seriously implicate any of the externalities that motivate procedural design, while other questions may implicate all of them.
We illustrate this by treating each type of externality—system, strategic, and public-goods—as a distinct axis or dimension
in three-dimensional space. We can then locate a particular type
of procedure or type of case in this 3D space, depending on which
externalities are at stake. For example, the question of whether
judicial decisions should be made public or revealed only to the
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parties has major implications for the public-goods quality of litigation but may have relatively small impacts on system externalities like the length of court proceedings or on strategic externalities like parties using procedure to run up opponents’ costs.59
Finally, in Part IV.C, we use the cube to identify the best
choices for procedural flexibility depending on the combination of
types of externalities involved. To continue the example from
above, if the question is publicity of judicial decisions, the degree
of flexibility should reflect the fact that the public-goods externality is large, while the other externalities may be modest. As we
will argue, judicial control—inflexibility—may be the best response to this externality. This is, of course, what we observe in
practice—judges decide, often upon parties’ requests, whether
their decision will become public. In this example, our theory
agrees with practice. In other instances, such as some forms of
discovery, our theory will point to a radical departure from current practice—such as adhering to market-based or pay-per-use
mechanisms.
After constructing the cube and discussing its implications
for procedural design, we then turn in Part V to (very tentatively)
consider further potential policy implications of our analysis.
A. Different Forms of Flexibility Address Different Types of
Externalities
Let’s begin by taking the types of externalities one at a time
and matching them to the forms of procedural flexibility that will
tend to be best suited to address them. (In the next Section, we
will then consider the externalities together.) For each type of externality, we will consider examples at both the “case level” (what
kinds of cases will involve this type of externality) and at the “procedure level” (what kinds of procedures will implicate this type of
externality).
Once we recognize that the concerns that animate procedural
design represent different types of externalities, we see that the
considerations that go into questions of procedural design are familiar ones. First, giving an actor control over the choice of procedure allows that actor to protect his interests, and excluding an
actor from control over procedure means that those with control

59 Of course, in some cases, whether the decision of the court is public may well drive
parties’ strategy, generating strategic externalities and even system externalities.
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can externalize costs onto him. For example, giving judges discretion over procedure allows judges to account for system externalities (especially congestion and third-party costs) among cases in
their courtrooms, to protect weak parties from negative strategic
externalities imposed on them, and to protect the public from being denied the public-goods externalities embedded in good precedent. However, it does not protect the wider court system from
judges externalizing spillover costs from their courts to others.
Second, including more actors in agreeing upon procedure
raises the transaction costs associated with bargaining (for parties) and decision-making (for judges). Procedural flexibility that
involves the parties and judges reaching agreement maximizes
transaction costs. Thus, externalities with diffuse, system-wide
effects can be addressed at lower cost through market-based regulatory approaches, such as cap-and-trade, cap-and-auction, or
Pigouvian fees.
As we argue below, these considerations mean that, at least
in general, markets in procedure do well with system externalities. As will seem intuitive to most economists, we will argue that
market-based mechanisms permit a better allocation of judicial
resources than any attempt by judges to optimally manage, one
at a time, hundreds of thousands of individual cases. But markets
require more nuance when considering strategic externalities and
public-goods externalities, which often depend on case-specific
factors rather than system-wide conditions. This explains why, in
an era of market-based regulation, the approaches we identify
still seem unintuitive.
1. System externalities.
First, consider system externalities. This type of externality
includes the effects of a case on cost, congestion, delay, and the
like for third parties and the court system as a whole. At the case
level, cases most likely to affect system externalities would include complex mass litigation and class actions—cases that involve extensive motion practice and judicial involvement (but
which can also generate economies of scale through aggregation
of claims). At the procedure level, any procedure that provides for
motion practice and hearings has the potential to burden the
court, and therefore increase congestion and delay in the entire
system. Parties have an incentive to file motions when they expect to gain from a favorable ruling, notwithstanding any negative effect this has on the court’s ability to give justice to other
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parties in other cases. Like a traffic jam on a busy highway, every
driver has a reason to be driving, but every driver wishes that the
other drivers weren’t on the road.
As noted above in Part II.A, system externalities are not limited to congestion externalities. Even if judges and parties perfectly accounted for the congestion costs of procedure within their
individual courts and cases, there are still spillover effects on
other courts and third-party effects on persons not even in court.
An example of the former is a court that reduces congestion on its
docket by dismissing cases for lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, or forum non conveniens. Congestion isn’t eliminated so
much as moved elsewhere. An example of the latter is third-party
discovery. A deposition of a nonparty may be very valuable to the
parties, but it is nothing but a burden on the deponent. If the parties do not compensate the deponent, then they do not internalize
that cost.
These externalities are not unlike externalities familiar to
economists and policymakers in other contexts. And like externalities in other contexts—traffic, pollution, and so on—they involve
harms that are largely fungible. In terms of the system externality at issue, it doesn’t matter which cars are on the road, just the
total number of cars on the road. It doesn’t matter who is emitting
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, just the total carbon footprint. And it doesn’t matter which cases have hearings, just the
total amount of court time consumed.60
For these reasons, market-based solutions or prices are optimal policy responses to system externalities. Just as a cap-andtrade system for sulfur emissions essentially eliminated acid rain
in North America (and is being used in some jurisdictions for carbon emissions),61 we might imagine that a cap-and-trade system
for the total amount of court time in hearings or the total number
of pages of filings would reduce system externalities: parties who
“hog” court time would be forced to pay for it while parties who
use less court time would be monetarily rewarded. Alternatively,
just as toll lanes are a solution for traffic congestion, activities
that increase system externalities should be priced with fees to
disincentivize their use (on the margin).

60 As we will see later, the nature of cases becomes important when we deal with
public-goods externalities.
61 See, e.g., Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://perma.cc/M4JH-NUKD.
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Notably, these suggestions are radical relative to current
rules, which focus on proactive judicial oversight and case management to ensure that cases do not drag on or consume excessive
court time.62 In our view, this solution is paradoxical: If the problem is that the excessive devotion of court time and attention to
problematic cases leads to cost and delay, how can the solution be
for the court to devote more time and attention to those cases?
Existing rules and exhortations from judges and rule makers63 for
better case management and party cooperation do not work because they cannot work. What is needed are forms of procedural
flexibility that address the misalignment of incentives caused by
the system externality.
2. Strategic externalities.
Second, consider strategic externalities. This type of externality includes the deliberate imposition of costs on a party opponent for the purpose of gaining strategic advantage in litigation.
At the case level, this occurs when the case itself is the weapon
(think of SLAPP suits).64 More germane to procedural design, at
the procedure level, strategic externalities arise in contexts such
as party discovery, where a discovery request is made not with
the goal of uncovering facts but simply to pressure the other side
into settlement to avoid the costs of responding.
The externalities from gamesmanship are both easier and
harder to address than system externalities. They are easier because they do not extend beyond the individual case. In this respect, they do not require system-wide solutions because the impact of the externality is at the case level, not the court level. But
they are harder because the harms are not fungible in the same
way as system externalities. A one-hour hearing in one case versus another case is an hour of the judge’s time either way. But a
broad discovery request in one case may reflect the strategic imposition of costs while in another case it may be uncontroversially
appropriate.
62

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note.
See id.; Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357–63 (D. Md.
2008) (discussing problems associated with abusive discovery).
64 See generally Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPP), 7 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 33 (1989); Nina Golden, SLAPP Down: The Use (and Abuse)
of Anti-SLAPP Motions to Strike, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 426 (2015). See also Gilson,
supra note 20, at 875–76 (analyzing the use of “litigation not to vindicate a substantive
legal right, but as a strategic device to secure a business advantage by imposing costs on
the other party”).
63
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Parties’ control is an obvious way to make sure that one party
cannot unilaterally impose costs on its adversary. This is why
very few deviations from the default civil procedure rules can be
done unilaterally. As long as the parties are both equally rational,
sophisticated, and resourced, parties’ control might be enough. In
contrast, any asymmetry along these dimensions might call for
either judicial control to protect the weak party or the use of price
mechanisms to prevent the strong party from raising his rival’s
costs to make him surrender the case.
How can we use the price mechanism to address strategic externalities? The goal in addressing strategic externalities is, as
with any externality, to internalize the costs imposed. We distinguish between three levels of externalities. For small strategic externalities, we think that fixed compensation can work. If a party
wants two more pages for its briefs, the strategic externality is
quite small, and a fixed compensation to the other party (which
could be set in a government-provided menu) might be enough for
the purpose of internalization.65
For midlevel strategic externalities, our suggestion is what
we call “tethering”—tying together the fortunes of both parties so
that imposing unnecessary costs on an adversary is self-defeating.
For example, some scholars have proposed—and some courts
have experimented with the idea—that the requesting party in
discovery must compensate the producing party for its costs of
production beyond a certain threshold.66 Here, the compensation
might not be fixed but rather based on the party’s actual costs.67
Lastly, when the strategic externalities are large, judicial
control—either separate from or together with the use of pricing—
is a viable option. But caution is warranted here: to the extent
65 Of course, a fixed fee to the government might be needed to compensate for the
system externality too.
66 See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341–43 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(requiring the requesting party to pay for costs of additional discovery after extensive discovery had already taken place); Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., No. 18-1100, 2020
WL 3288058, at *10–13 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (shifting costs of additional discovery to
requesting party after review revealed that additional discovery was redundant with prior
productions).
67 As before, a fee might be needed to reimburse the government for system externalities. Note that the distributive effects of the expense of this proposal to requesting
parties are not a reason to reject it. Maldistribution of resources in the civil justice system
is itself a public-goods externality and can be addressed through subsidies. Poor parties
could receive lump-sum credits for the cost of discovery (and those who do not or cannot
use them can sell those credits on the market). But a tethering solution increases the
marginal cost of additional discovery, which should disincentivize impositional discovery
by the rich and poor alike.
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that judicial supervision of party gamesmanship becomes a burden on courts, this would replace a strategic externality with a
system externality. Below, we show how our theory of civil procedure can deal with simultaneous externalities.
Current approaches to strategic externalities are not entirely
out of step with our analysis here. As noted above, some courts
have undertaken active judicial supervision of cases to ward off
strategic behavior, and a few courts have even experimented with
“tethering” by requiring the party imposing costs to also compensate (in part) for those costs. In the main, however, courts largely
take a hands-off approach to discovery and many other partydriven aspects of strategic litigation. Our analysis, therefore, is
an invitation to consider more creative alternatives to address
strategic externalities.
3. Public-goods externalities.
Third, consider public-goods externalities. As we’ve explained, this type of externality implicates the impact of the
courts on society as a whole through legal precedents that clarify
the law, provide future actors with certainty regarding the legally
expected behavior, legitimize the authority of the civil justice system, and so on. At the case level, a case implicating public-goods
externalities would be, for example, a suit raising a novel legal
question of general importance. At the procedure level, we might
think of matters that implicate court legitimacy but that individual parties don’t have a stake in, such as judges wearing black
robes.68
These externalities are the hardest to address through party
control over procedure. By their nature, public-goods externalities
affect the court system as a whole and, even beyond that, society
as a whole. As a consequence, we cannot expect one or both parties to fully account for these benefits, even if each party fully internalizes the costs and benefits of their actions on the other parties, the judge, or the court system as a whole. This is the key
feature of public-goods externalities that procedural design must
account for. The first lesson in this context, therefore, is that unilateral action, agreement between the parties, or even agreement
68 More generally, the formalized rituals of judicial hearings and trials can be understood as serving the public-goods interest in the legitimacy and authority of courts. The
fact that arbitration is usually specifically designed to do away with these elements of
court procedure reflects its suitability for resolution of disputes that concern only the parties before it.
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among the parties and the judge will be inadequate to address the
externality. If parties are to be involved in exercising flexibility,
there must be fees or subsidies attached to align their incentives
with the public interest. For example, if parties prefer that the
decision be unpublished or that their settlement (approved by the
court) remain secret, they might have to compensate the court for
the system externalities, the treasury for the lost public-goods externalities, or some combination of the two.
Although it can be argued that all cases create public goods
to some extent, some public-goods externalities are particular to
individual cases. For example, most cases do not raise legal questions that will give rise to new precedent, but some will. For these
types of externalities, fixed subsidies or one-size-fits-all mandates
will not work well. In this context, judicial control may be necessary, so the judge should have discretion to flex into or out of a
procedure based on the presence or absence of the public-goods
externality.69
For example, if a case is a good vehicle for setting valuable
precedent, we might imagine a rule that encourages amici curiae
to provide the judge with as many good legal arguments on both
sides as possible. We can even imagine a rule that says that the
judge can overrule the parties and have control over whether the
case can settle.
Subsidies and judicial control can be combined, such as by
giving judges discretion to award subsidies to cases raising important legal issues. For example, when courts identify a case
with a significant public interest component, they could provide
more pages for the briefs, more oral argument time, funding for
attorney fees, waiver of court fees, funding for expert witnesses,
and even the right to a second appeal.70
B. Externalities in Three Dimensions
Now that we have discussed each type of externality in isolation, we bring them together, as we did before, by discussing them

69 We recognize that even judges’ incentives are not ideal in this context because they
do not internalize the larger public benefit. But to the extent that public goods are idiosyncratic to certain cases, we believe that judges’ incentives are better aligned than parties’ incentives to correctly identify those cases with the distinctive public-goods value.
70 Subsidizing expert witnesses or having discretion to grant a free second (or third)
appeal are unfamiliar policy options in the United States, but these policies are codified
law in Israel for cases involving the public interest. See infra note 78 and accompanying
text.

2022]

Toward a New Theory of Civil Litigation

35

both at the case level and at the procedure level. Our key claim
here is that the externalities are not opposites, such that procedures with more of one type would have less of the others. Rather,
each type of externality runs along a separate dimension, such
that any given case or any given procedure could have more or less
of each externality. We illustrate this with a three-dimensional
representation of the three externalities in Figure 3. Each arrow
represents increasing externalities in a given dimension. The farther one goes along an arrow, the greater the risk of significant
externalities and the greater the need for procedural design to
address that externality.

System Externality

FIGURE 3: THE THREE DIMENSIONS
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Point A in Figure 3 represents a situation with large system
externalities but little gamesmanship or societal significance. We
can think of this as a factually complex but legally uninteresting
task for the court. But we need not limit ourselves to court settings. When there are large system externalities but few concerns
about gamesmanship or the production of public goods, alternatives to court may be optimal. Courts have elaborate procedures
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to control party behavior (i.e., gamesmanship) and generate precedent and public proceedings (i.e., public goods), but these can
come with cost and delay (i.e., system externalities). Alternatives
to courts, such as statutory schemes like workers’ compensation
or victim-compensation funds, can operate with streamlined procedures to reduce costs when strategic and public-goods externalities are not at stake. Perhaps the purest example of a procedure
at Point A is the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001,71 a statutory scheme created by Congress in the wake of the
September 11 attacks to provide government-funded compensation to the victims of the attacks in lieu of litigation. In this context, there was little concern about gamesmanship (given that the
victims were an identifiable group) and few public-goods externalities (given that the wrongdoers—Al Qaeda—were beyond the
reach of civil process, making deterrence irrelevant). But calculating individual damages would be expensive, and litigation against
deep-pocketed potential defendants (such as United Airlines and
American Airlines) would be complex and highly uncertain.
Point B describes a scenario with large public-goods externalities and little or no system or strategic externalities. The scenario implicates legal questions of broad interest but is otherwise
simple and has few opportunities for gamesmanship. Many issues
in civil procedure that are resolved by the Supreme Court fall into
this category. A simple example of this is rules governing the calculation of filing deadlines in federal court. While some deadlines
are easy to calculate, complexities sometimes arise that require
judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, for example, has
sought to clarify when a late-filed amendment to a pleading “relates back” to the original pleading so that it is timely.72 What is
important is that all parties have a clear rule. Litigation over the
rule isn’t particularly complex or strategic; rather, the parties
simply need an answer.73
71

Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 114 Stat. 230 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30–32 (1986); Krupski v. Costa Crociere
S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548–54 (2010).
73 This situation arises outside the procedural context as well. An example of this is
Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938), the very first case to apply Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)—in fact, just one week after Erie was decided.
The issue in Ruhlin involved the interpretation of the “incontestability clause” that was
present in many life- and disability-insurance contracts that New York Life had issued. The
defendant New York Life prevailed on appeal, and the plaintiff Ruhlin petitioned for certiorari, citing a circuit split. New York Life, notably, did not oppose the petition. Ruhlin,
304 U.S. at 205. More important to the insurance company than winning the case, it would
seem, was having the Supreme Court announce a clear rule for all the federal courts.
72
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Point C describes a scenario with large strategic externalities
and little or no public-goods or system externalities. We can think
of this as a simple—but big-money or otherwise contentious—dispute (either an entire case or a specific issue within a case) of no
societal importance but which creates opportunities for gamesmanship. Perhaps the best example for Point C is a contentious
family law dispute, such as an acrimonious divorce proceeding that
doesn’t involve extensive hearing time or otherwise clog the courts
but that does involve impositional discovery requests, harassing
motion practice, or the like.
Importantly, each type of externality, and thus each arrow,
points in a different direction. Point D is at the base of each arrow, and we can think of it as the origin in a three-dimensional
space defined by three axes. Point D represents a distinctive set
of litigation scenarios: those with few externalities of any type. At
the case level, some entire categories of cases might fit here, such
as small-claims proceedings in specialized courts with simplified
proceedings or routine arbitrations among repeat-play commercial
actors. At the procedure level, this could include routine aspects of
procedure, such as scheduling the order of witnesses or issuing
interrogatories.
Notably, small-claims court and commercial arbitration are
both known for their informality and flexibility of procedure.74
This is not only the current state of practice but also exactly what
our framework would suggest. When all three types of externalities are low, there is no need to worry about misalignment between party interests and larger systemic or societal interests.
Whatever works best for the parties or the arbiter should be allowed because the only goal here is dispute resolution between
the parties. In this context, therefore, so long as the disputed issue or even the entire case is not socially important and deviations from the procedural rules cause no externalities, it makes
sense for party control to be the order of the day; the law is merely
a default. That is why arbitrators don’t wear black robes and
small-claims courts don’t publish their opinions.
Of course, not all disputes or procedural issues fit neatly into
only one type of externality (or none at all). Indeed, what makes
procedural design so challenging is precisely that distinct interests—sometimes many distinct interests—are all implicated by
74 Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. BAR
FOUND. RSCH. J. 293, 336–37; Leslie G. Kosmin, The Small Claims Court Dilemma, 13
HOUS. L. REV. 934, 955 (1976).
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the same procedure. For example, high-stakes, complex factual
issues tend to involve broad and expensive discovery (and thus
potentially impositional discovery requests) and extensive motion
practice (some of which may be driven by strategic externalities
rather than the merits of the claim), both of which also require
time-consuming judicial supervision, causing system externalities. Our three-dimensional space provides a canvas on which we
can visualize all the different possible combinations of externalities working at the same time. Figure 4 builds on Figure 3 and
presents the cube—a way of locating any procedural issue in a
conceptual space based on the types of externalities it implicates.
FIGURE 4: THE CUBE
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Point E describes a scenario with large public-goods externalities and large strategic externalities but few system externalities. This is a dispute that is simple but raises important issues
and, despite its simplicity, can give rise to gamesmanship—perhaps because the stakes are high or because there is a resource
imbalance between the parties. At the case level, we could imagine a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law where there
are no factual issues and the legal issues are straightforward but
where the parties play games with forum shopping or amicus

2022]

Toward a New Theory of Civil Litigation

39

briefs. At the procedure level, we might think of some issues that
implicate court legitimacy but can be gamed by the parties, such
as requests that the court rely only on affidavits, requests to limit
the number of witnesses, requests to have no cross-examination
of witnesses, or even requests that the court flip a coin to resolve
some issues (all of which reduce system externalities). These may
seem unlikely in current practice, but consider confidential settlements: these deprive the action of transparency and the possibility of norm creation, and they may also implicate concerns
about parties using confidentiality to impose costs on (or extract
money from) their counterparts.
Point F describes a scenario with large public-goods externalities and large system externalities but few strategic externalities. This is a dispute that is complex and raises socially important issues but, despite these factors, doesn’t involve much
gamesmanship. At the case level, we might think of a case that is
factually simple, but which raises very sensitive and novel legal
issues, such that public-goods externalities are high and (for the
very same reason) the burden on the court is high. For example,
constitutional-tort test cases—especially if the government is the
defendant and strategic externalities are therefore expected to be
relatively low—may fit the mold here. At the procedure level, judicial opinion writing might fit into this category. Judicial opinions
are a source of public-goods externalities—they are how lawyers
and the public are informed about the law by courts—but they are
also a time-consuming part of a judge’s work.
Point G describes a scenario with large system externalities
and large strategic externalities but few public-goods externalities. This is a dispute that is complex and subject to gamesmanship but doesn’t implicate legal precedent. At the case level, we
expect that most complex litigation (including class actions and
MDL) is going to fall in this category. Highly contentious—even
if not complex—cases can further involve the imposition of high
costs on the parties and the courts. Some complex family law and
trust law court battles typify this category. Imagine estranged
family members disputing a large estate and related trusts after
a wealthy family member dies. Like the simple but acrimonious
divorce example for Point C, the proceedings here involve strategic externalities as the parties attempt to wear each other down
with discovery and motion practice. But unlike the divorce example, the complex trusts and estates context requires that the court
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interpret a dense web of legal documents, appoint special masters, and conduct an accounting of trust assets, all of which generate large system externalities. At the procedure level, an example would be judge-time-intensive motions—like summary
judgment motions or sanctions motions—especially if these require the judge to hand down a written opinion.
Point H describes a scenario where all types of externalities
are substantial. Precedent or other public goods are at stake, the
case is highly complex and burdensome on the court system, and
the parties have occasion for gamesmanship. At the case level,
you have blockbuster, cutting-edge class actions, MDLs, and impact litigation (which, by its nature, has broad social importance,
high stakes, and high-intensity lawyering). At the procedure
level, consider jury trials. They serve many public values, but jury
trials are expensive and a playground for gamesmanship by sophisticated lawyers.
By locating a given issue within the cube, we gain insight into
how procedural design can be used to address the externalities
that are relevant to that issue. We now turn to this.
C. Procedural Design in Three Dimensions
In Part IV.A, we discussed how each type of externality called
for a potential mix of forms of procedural flexibility that were
suited to the scope of the externality—for strategic, within one
case; for system, across cases; and for public-goods, extending beyond the courts. And in Part IV.B, we noted how different types
of cases—and different procedures within cases—can implicate
zero, one, two, or all three types of externalities. This raises the
question: If different types of externalities call for different types
of procedural flexibility, how does one decide what form of flexibility, if any, applies to scenarios involving two or three types of
externalities? The challenge here is to identify a form of flexibility
that is appropriate for the relevant externalities. So, for example,
if judicial control is appropriate at Point B (public-goods externality only) and at Point C (strategic externality only), then we
would deem it appropriate at Point E (public-goods and strategic
externality).
For some points in the cube, this is straightforward. For
Point E, as just noted, judicial control is well suited for many publicgoods and strategic externalities. Solutions reliant on prices or
subsidies are tricky here because the public-good aspect points
toward subsidies but the strategic aspect points toward prices and
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taxes. Nonetheless, pricing and subsidies may be appropriate. For
example, amicus curiae briefs may be valuable in a case involving
an important legal issue, but a court may be concerned about parties evading limits on the length of briefs by recruiting additional
amici in order to file multiple briefs with related arguments. Judicial control (simply refusing to accept additional amici) is one
option, but requiring parties to pay a fee to the court or to compensate their opponents in order to raise the limits on amici is an option too. The fees would net out both the desire to subsidize amici
in order to increase the quality of the judicial process (public-goods
externality) and the need to disincentivize excess briefing (system
externality). The compensation will cause the party paying for the
amici support to internalize the strategic externality it potentially imposes on the other party by evading limits on briefs’
lengths.
Likewise, for Point G, both system and strategic externalities
are amenable to market-based regulation that forces parties to
internalize the costs that their actions impose on others. Although judicial control is well suited for strategic externalities, it
is not well suited for system externalities—remember that addressing system externalities, almost by definition, requires efforts to reduce judicial involvement.
But what if our prescriptions for different externalities point
in entirely different directions? This occurs where system and
public-goods externalities are both substantial—at Points F and
H on the cube in Figure 4. In some respects, these externalities
can both be managed with price-based mechanisms, even though
the externalities point in different directions (fees versus subsidies). For example, should filing fees for a complaint in a civil action be positive or negative? From a public-goods perspective,
there may be value to incentivizing litigation. But from a systemexternalities perspective, additional filings add to court congestion. In principle, these countervailing considerations can be netted out. (The status quo, which involves a partial subsidy for case
filing, may reflect such a balancing.) One could take the same approach to procedures that apply generally across cases that implicate both public goods and court congestion, such as hearing time
or jury trials, and require that parties requesting those procedures pay the court system a reduced fee while fully compensating their opponents.
But the difficulty here comes from public goods that depend
on the circumstances of the case—test cases for precedent, class
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actions of broad social significance, or the like. These cases generate large positive externalities to the legal system and society
but also consume court attention and resources. The net benefits
of judicial attention to these cases cannot be priced ex ante because they depend on the case. Some precedents are more important than others. Consequently, we must rely on ad hoc judgments, by judges, about whether a given case merits extra
attention due to its importance. In other words, the form of flexibility that is likely most appropriate here is judicial control, if
even to determine whether specific cases should be subsidized by
the state.
Nonetheless, we hasten to add that from the perspective of a
rule maker (who must ask what solutions will work for the court
system as a whole), the difficult questions at the intersection of
large public-goods externalities and large system externalities
are narrow in scope. This is because most cases simply don’t have
particularly large implications for society. Even among complex
litigation, MDLs, and class actions, most are of concern almost
exclusively to the parties, class members, and lawyers.
We have now identified—admittedly, at only a high level of
abstraction so far—preferred forms of procedural flexibility for
cases and procedures depending on which externalities they implicate (i.e., where they fall in the cube in Figure 4). What we see
is that when public-goods externalities are large (the region
bounded by Points B, E, F, and H), party control or market-based
mechanisms may be useful for some procedures, while for others
procedural flexibility should be limited to judicial control. Such
judicial control would not, however, be limited to what we are
used to (accepting or rejecting motions) but may include judges
awarding compensation between parties, waiving filing fees, or
even awarding ad hoc subsidies.
When public-goods externalities are not paramount, however, markets and prices—although not often used in current
practice—are well suited to address system externalities and
strategic externalities (Points A, C, and G). And when no externalities are large (Point D), there is no need to constrain procedural flexibility or introduce market-based solutions. Within any
given case, parties should have flexibility to alter procedure by
agreement.
Figure 5 summarizes our conclusions from this Part. The
“flex zone” represents the area where party control dominates. It
is where all types of externalities are small or medium. The entire
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region of the cube where the public-goods externality is high requires judicial control—rather than party flexibility—although
pricing (including negative prices, i.e., subsidies) may be an option for regulating party choices (such as filing suit) that affect
public goods. When system externalities or gamesmanship are
primary concerns, however, our analysis recommends consideration of more innovative approaches—some mix of markets and
prices could be employed.
FIGURE 5: PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY AS A FUNCTION OF
EXTERNALITIES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
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To be clear, these “zones” are merely generalizations to organize ideas about the relationships between externalities and
forms of procedural flexibility. When we leave the realm of abstraction and enter the realm of concrete policy and specific procedures, much more nuance is required. For specific procedures,
flexibility (not inflexibility) may be appropriate even when public
goods are paramount. Conversely, judicial control rather than
markets may be best to address certain system externalities. The
devil, as is usually the case, is in the details. But, as we are not
afraid of the devil (!), we therefore devote the remainder of this
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Article to beginning a conversation about specific procedures or
practices and how our analysis can inform policy choices on the
ground. We use our cube as a general starting point but then prescribe remedies based on the nuanced reality of specific issues in
civil procedure. As we will show in Part V, current practice sometimes reflects a sound, implicit understanding of how procedural
flexibility can address externalities in procedure. Other times,
our suggestion is that innovating with markets or other novel
mechanisms may offer a path forward for addressing dilemmas of
procedural design.
V. POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We emphasize that our theory of procedure is not merely normative but also prescriptive: it can speak to concrete policy
choices embodied in specific rules of procedure. In this Part, we
consider a handful of specific examples of real-world procedural
rules. We did not choose those examples randomly but rather
chose those over which there are active debates. We use three
main examples to show how our framework can simplify or harmonize the analysis or identify potential procedural innovations
that could mark a novel “third way” in polarized debates. Out of
the three, our main example discusses class actions and MDL—
two of the most highly debated procedural mechanisms currently
applied by judicial systems. Class actions and MDLs are subject
to contentious debate precisely because they involve many types
of externalities, making them an ideal ground on which we can
apply the framework brought forward in this Article.
A. Expert Witnesses and Amici Curiae
For some claims, current law requires parties to support their
claims with expert opinions. In some states, a party can’t file a
medical malpractice case unless it has a physician expert supporting his claim.75 Experts providing reliable scientific evidence confer a public-goods externality on the system; they help the court
reach an informed and hopefully correct outcome that can serve
as useful precedent. Requiring expert testimony may also reduce

75 See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2013); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1012 to -1013
(1976); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-A (MCKINNEY 1986). For a compilation of twenty-nine state
statutes that require an affidavit of merit in medical malpractice cases, see Christine
Funk, Affidavits of Merit in Medical Malpractice Cases, EXPERT INST. (June 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/GXV5-MEMN.
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system externalities to the extent that it blocks or deters meritless
claims that no expert could be found to support. At the same time,
to the extent that parties engage in an arms race for expert opinions based on junk science, they also create a strategic externality.
To cheaply reduce strategic externalities, we might expect courts
to check the credentials of experts and evidence. For example,
courts might look at the expert’s record of scholarship and
whether the research has been subject to peer review. Indeed, the
standard established by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,76 does just that. Still, experts passing the Daubert standard
and the cross-examinations that follow their testimony delay trials and impose costs on opponents and therefore create system
and strategic externalities. The “battle of the experts” is a costly
event—not just for the parties but for the system as a whole. Here
we sometimes find courts appointing their own experts to avoid
these particular system externalities.77
But why not do this more often? It seems to us that in most
cases (e.g., a car crash with accident-reconstruction experts),
there is little public-good benefit, other than perhaps educating
the judge about relevant science that might apply in future cases.
Strategic and system externalities loom larger than public-goods
concerns in most of these cases. This suggests that the solution
should entail less party flexibility and perhaps some regulation
in the form of Pigouvian taxes and money paid to the other party.
Because experts burden the system more than they benefit it in
the typical case, this activity should be taxed.
In contrast, in cases with large public-goods externalities, the
reverse would be true. We may want to invite nonparties to propose experts, perhaps via the mechanism of amici curiae. Or we
can just have more court-appointed experts. And the price mechanism can work here as well, through subsidies instead of taxes.
If this sounds far-fetched, it isn’t. In Israel, there is governmentsponsored funding worth 1.5 million NIS annually that covers experts in class actions that the fund committee finds to be socially

76

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
For articles giving examples of state and federal courts appointing their own experts, see, for example, Stephanie Domitrovich, Mara L. Merlino & James T. Richardson,
State Trial Judge Use of Court Appointed Experts: Survey Results and Comparisons, 50
JURIMETRICS 371, 375–77, 387–89 (2010); Shirley A. Dobbin, Sophia I. Gatowski, Rebecca
J. Eyre, Veronica B. Dahir, Mara L. Merlino & James T. Richardson, Federal and State Trial
Judges on the Proffer and Presentation of Expert Evidence, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 11–12 (2007).
77
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important—or, in the lingo of our framework, that generate large
public-goods externalities.78
Indeed, it is worth considering the extent to which the discussion here applies to discovery generally, not just experts. A lot
(probably most) of discovery has few public-goods ramifications
but can be used for strategic reasons. This may help explain why
the United States is an extreme outlier internationally in its use
of party-driven discovery.79 If strategic externalities are a major
concern, parties should not have unilateral control over the procedure. Most countries utilize a system of court-directed discovery, which seems more consistent with our analysis. Nonetheless,
court-directed discovery raises a different concern—a greater burden on the court, which generates system externalities. Thus, the
U.S. approach to discovery, insofar as it is party driven, may reflect prioritization of system externalities over strategic externalities.80 Party-driven discovery allows the court, in most cases, to
withdraw from the litigation process for the entire phase from the
end of pleading to the beginning of trial or summary judgment.
Nonetheless, experts may really be different. A notable distinction between expert discovery and other forms of discovery is
that other forms of discovery are limited to the evidence that already exists. Experts are about creating new evidence, which has
no limit in principle. For this reason, strategic-externality concerns may loom even larger. Hence, our focus is on experts here.
Perhaps an even more valuable method for the introduction
of new information crucial for court rulings in high-stakes, highpublic-goods externality cases is amicus curiae briefing. Indeed,
78 Class Actions Law, 5776–2016, SH 2054 264 (Isr.). For discussion, see Eli Bukspan,
The Israeli Public Class Action Fund: New Approach for Integrating Business and Social
Responsibility, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CLASS ACTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY 528, 532–35 (Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2021) (noting that
the fund serves to pay expert-witness fees to support socially important cases and guarantees legal fees imposed on plaintiffs—under the loser-pays rule—in unsuccessful cases).
79 Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 299, 301–07 (2002).
80 Discovery was not originally envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules to
pose significant opportunities for gamesmanship. See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E.
Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 931 (1976). Depositions—not document discovery—were seen as the centerpiece of discovery, and the Rules
easily limit the abuse of deposition discovery through numerical limits. In other words,
procedural inflexibility—rather than open-ended party control, which more accurately
characterizes the discovery process for documents, tangible things, and electronically
stored information. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (limiting depositions, presumptively, to ten per side), with FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (imposing no numerical limits on requests
for production).
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in a court system with judicial precedent, a tension exists between
the fact that an individual case resolves a concrete dispute between two parties and the fact that the decision sets a precedent
that potentially affects future parties whose interests are not directly represented in the present suit. One way that courts address this tension between the public-goods externality of judicial
precedent and the private incentives of individual parties is to
permit nonparties to file amicus briefs. The main role of amicus
briefs is to enrich courts with more and better legal arguments.81
In principle, amicus briefs ensure that a court properly accounts
for the broader effects of its decision on nonparties, thereby maximizing the public-goods benefit of judicial precedent.
Amicus briefs have a downside too. They exacerbate congestion caused by a proliferation of briefs and cause delay as timelines extend to accommodate them. Parties can use them strategically. A party seeking to evade word limits or to raise an
opponent’s costs of responding to arguments can recruit third parties to file amicus briefs. Such briefs might be written by the party
itself and merely signed by the third party.82
These factors would lead us to expect a proliferation of amicus activity in high-stakes, precedential litigation, and that is
what we see. The number of amicus briefs has increased dramatically over the past decades. In the U.S. Supreme Court alone,
about eight hundred amicus briefs are filed each term (an average
of about fourteen briefs per case).83 This is an 800% increase from
the 1950s and a 95% increase from 1995.84
If the public-goods value of amicus briefs is high, we should
see courts citing those briefs, and it appears that they do. Indeed,
Supreme Court Justices routinely cite amicus briefs, with many of
them doing it in more than a third of their opinions, and one of
them, Justice Elena Kagan, doing it (in the 2017 term) in two-thirds

81 Experts can sometimes inform the court about the law in other countries, and
amici curiae can inform the court about relevant facts or technologies relevant to the case.
82 For a recent article describing how orchestrated and intentional the amicus world
is, see generally Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV.
1901 (2016).
83 Id. at 1902.
84 Id.
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of her opinions.85 More importantly, briefs are often thought to exert influence on the Court’s final rulings.86
Given that the benefits of amicus briefs must be weighed
against their costs, we should expect the use of these briefs to drop
off as the public-goods externality falls, such as when the court is
lower in the legal hierarchy. Thus, it is not surprising that amicus
briefs are so prevalent in the Supreme Court and less so in other
courts. As a normative matter, since the public-goods externalities in the U.S. Supreme Court are large, amicus briefs should be
encouraged (at least, up to the point where the incremental costs
of more briefs balance the incremental benefits).
Indeed, our theory suggests that, even in the Supreme Court,
there should be rules mitigating strategic and system externalities. The Supreme Court is a setting where all three externalities
are potentially large. Thus, our theoretical framework suggests
that parties should have less flexibility.87
Consistent with what our theory would predict regarding
strategic and system externalities, the Supreme Court has issued
(only recently, unfortunately) explicit formal guidance on the
standards for filing amicus briefs.88 The guidance announced
rules that combat system and strategic externalities. To combat
system externalities, the guidance explicitly provides word limits
to the briefs, including a requirement that the amicus certifies
compliance with the word limit.89 And with respect to delay, the
guide states that the Court will not entertain motions to extend
various filing deadlines or to file a reply brief.90
Our theory, however, opens up new, more creative ways to
combat system externalities. For example, one could imagine a
cap on the total number of words allowed in all amicus briefs filed
in a Supreme Court term and then have parties trade words
within the cap (cap-and-trade). This would be an example of a
scenario where market-based solutions may be appropriate even
85 Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Review:
‘Friends of the Court’ Roared Back in 2017-18 Term, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 16, 2018).
86 See Larsen & Devins, supra note 82, at 1954–55. Professors Joseph Kearney and
Tom Merrill cite several cases where the court explicitly relied on arguments raised only
in the amicus curie briefs. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 745 n.5 (2000).
87 See supra Figure 5, Point H.
88 SCOTT S. HARRIS, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., MEMORANDUM TO THOSE INTENDING TO
FILE AN AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2019),
https://perma.cc/QL2K-FPJ8.
89 See id. at 5.
90 See id. at 2–3, 6.
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in a setting (the Supreme Court) where large public-goods externalities otherwise require a heavy dose of direct judicial control.
To combat strategic externalities, the guide requires parties’
consent for amicus briefs, presumably enabling a party to signal
to the Court its fears that the opponent is using the amicus briefs
strategically.91 In such a case, the Court itself will decide whether
to accept the brief. The guide also requires the brief to include the
interests of the amicus and to disclose the financial arrangements
of the parties involved in the brief.92
As before, our theory opens up new and potentially more effective options to combat strategic externalities. For example,
there could be a fee for filing an amicus brief that would balance
the (negative) system and the (positive) public-goods externalities
the brief creates. This fee could be a one-size-fits-all amount fixed
in advance, or it could depend on the importance of the case or
even on the contribution of the individual brief to the Court’s
analysis as determined by the Court in retrospect, similar to the
way that courts all over the country determine attorney’s fees in
thousands of cases a year. To combat strategic externalities, there
could be a limit on the number of amicus briefs filed by the parties
or, even better, on the ratio of the number of amicus briefs filed
by the parties, so that the strong party will not be able to bombard
the Court with many more legal documents than its opponent.
Alternatively, the side that has fewer amicus briefs could be compensated by getting more time for its oral arguments, and, to prevent system externalities, that time should come at the expense
of the stronger party.
B. The Boundaries of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Settlement and Withdrawal of Pending Cases and
Arbitration
We begin our discussion of alternative dispute resolution by
highlighting the simple notion that for a case to have value to anyone but the parties involved, it must receive some degree of publicity. It is thus evident that, as a society, we should strive for
cases with high public-goods externalities to be resolved within
courtrooms rather than privately, far away from the public eye.
In this Section, we consider two ways in which parties’ decisions

91
92

See id. at 1–2.
See id. at 4–5.
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can deprive cases of these public-goods externalities: settlement
and agreements to arbitrate.
1. Settlement.
Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on hearing cases
that allow it to resolve circuit splits. From the perspective of the
parties, the value of review by the Supreme Court may simply be
to decide which party wins. But from the perspective of the legal
system as a whole, the value of the case lies in its capacity to create
a uniform and predictable legal norm (i.e., a high level of publicgoods externalities). In the context of the Supreme Court, we
might not want parties to tinker with the rules because keeping
them untouched might be valuable for the case’s precedential
value.
When the public-goods externalities are very large, our objection to parties’ opting out from the default civil procedure rule is
large as well in that we might sometimes even object even to the
parties’ most basic way to opt out of procedure—by settlement.
While settlement is desirable in most cases and eliminates negative system externalities (of all types), it may be socially harmful
when parties settle in the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme
Court grants cert in exceedingly few cases per year (about 1% of
petitions for certiorari are granted),93 devotes a substantial fraction of its attention to each case, and chooses cases not because
those cases require dispute resolution but to set legal norms for
the courts. In this context, settlement by the parties after the
Court has invested significant resources may be privately optimal
for the parties but a waste of the Court’s resources and a lost opportunity for the provision of a public good. Thus, for a court like
the U.S. Supreme Court, the public-goods externality may be so
large that it displaces even traditionally accepted forms of procedural flexibility, such as allowing parties to withdraw a pending
case.94
93 See PUB. INFO. OFF., A REPORTER’S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 15–16 (2021), https://perma.cc/HME9-VAN4.
94 In Israel, the general rule is that the appeals court needs to approve a request to
withdraw the appeal. In one Israeli Supreme Court case, the parties asked the court to
extend the deadline for their briefs in order to let them mediate the case. The Supreme
Court refused. Later on, the parties asked the court to withdraw the appeal because they
successfully mediated the case, and the Supreme Court refused again. In both cases, the
Supreme Court explained that the issue was too principled for mediation and required a
full resolution by the court. CivA 7368/06 Dirot Yokra v. Gov-Ari, Nevo Legal Database,
at *11–12 (June 29, 2011) (Isr.).
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Alternatively, withdrawing parties might be required to compensate the court system for the system externality that they created and the treasury for the loss of the public-goods externality
that their case could have created. While the magnitude of the
compensation for the “lost chance” of public externality may be
fixed over time, the compensation for the system externality
might increase over time. If parties settle very late in the game
(say, a day before the Supreme Court opinion is delivered), they
should pay more for the congestion externality they have created
than if they settle early in the game (say, a day after their case
has been picked by the Supreme Court).95
2. Arbitration.
Another mechanism for alternative dispute resolution on
which our theory can shed new light is arbitration. Private arbitration under the FAA is an increasingly common—and increasingly controversial—form of dispute resolution. Viewed through
the lens of our framework, we see that both its popularity and its
controversy emanate from the mix of externalities implicated
when a dispute moves from court to arbitration. Indeed, each of
the major narratives about arbitration, pro and con, corresponds
to one dimension of externality.
The traditional proarbitration story is that litigation is beset
by cost, delay, and gamesmanship, and arbitration is a means for
faster and cheaper dispute resolution.96 This is basically an account
of system and strategic externalities pushing cases into arbitration.
The traditional antiarbitration story is that because arbitration is confidential and informal, dispute resolution through arbitration produces none of the most important benefits of litigation—development and exposition of the law, uniformity of

95 Of course, there are all sorts of complications here. Could parties settle their individual dispute but continue to litigate? If not, how could a court compel parties not to
settle? If so, would this still satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement under Article III?
We acknowledge these concerns but note that they are orthogonal to the normative argument we make. Furthermore, there may be ways to address these concerns if the value of
discouraging settlement is great enough. For example, the Court could favor certiorari for
petitioners who commit not to settle, perhaps even through posting a bond that would be
forfeited if the case settles before the Court renders its opinion. In any case, this concern
rarely arises in the U.S. Supreme Court given the infrequency of settlement in that court.
96 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010)
(“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the
courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, [and]
greater efficiency and speed.”).
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judgments, and public confidence.97 This is basically an account of
public-goods externalities lost when cases move to arbitration.
A more nuanced proarbitration story is that employment and
consumer-protection class action litigation is largely characterized by suits of low merit (or perhaps some merit but little practical importance) that nonetheless produce large paychecks for
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers who use impositional discovery
and other sharp tactics to extract lucrative settlements (for the
lawyers—not necessarily the class).98 This is basically an account
of strategic externalities in courts pushing cases into arbitration.
There is a mirror-image antiarbitration story, which is that
employment and consumer arbitration is a way to push claims of
high merit—or perhaps some merit but high aggregate value—
out of court (where the class action device would make them viable) and into individualized arbitration (where arbitral fees render claims impracticable).99 This is basically an account of strategic externalities in arbitration pushing cases into arbitration—
which makes things worse.
Organizing these arguments within our framework suggests
some possible paths for using arbitration in a way that serves the
goals underlying procedure. For cases of limited social concern
between parties of equal sophistication, arbitration is an uncontroversial ideal. Those cases fall in the flex zone in our cube, for
which party choice is maximized. If anything, we would want to
encourage more arbitration for cases in this region because of the
avoided system externalities.
For cases with some public-goods qualities or concerns about
strategic behavior, though, a more nuanced approach is necessary. Importantly, as our recitation of the arguments above notes,

97 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 426–27 (1999) (arguing that “judicial adjudication generates specific and general deterrence, educates the public, creates precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values” while arbitration does not).
98 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts
Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 494 (2000) (“Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers
can draft broad claims so as to pull in the greatest possible number of potential class members. A large class gives a plaintiffs’ attorney leverage against a defendant and creates the
potential to generate lucrative windfall fees with low marginal investment.”).
99 See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164, 169 (2013)
(discussing the prevalence of aggressive imposition of mandatory-arbitration clauses and
class action waivers by large service providers).
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the proarbitration argument based on strategic externalities depends on inefficiencies in the administration of court-related procedural rules—such as class action certification and discovery
rules. The claim is that these rules allow for gamesmanship by
plaintiffs with questionable claims. If so, then identifying the right
reforms for arbitration law is tied up in identifying the right reforms for court procedure. The case for limiting arbitration improves when the rules for litigation are reformed to address the
strategic externalities created by court-related procedures. Reduce
the pathologies of class actions and discovery that arise in large,
complex, and important cases, and the normative case for keeping
more cases in court and out of arbitration becomes one-sided.
But the debate over arbitration reform should not be limited
to arguments over whether the availability of arbitration should
be scaled back or whether arbitration should be banned for categories of disputes, such as consumer or employment cases. Our
analysis points to a more nuanced approach. Arbitration ameliorates system externalities, but it deprives the courts of their ability to generate public-goods externalities. (We set aside strategic
externalities, which cut both ways.) Given these facts, the design
of arbitration reforms should be tailored to retaining the benefits
of arbitration to system externalities while minimizing the costs to
public-goods externalities. Banning arbitration (altogether or for
categories of cases) only addresses the need to protect public-goods
externalities; it fails to account for system externality benefits.
We see alternatives that account for both. For example, one
concern about public-goods externalities is that entire areas of
law are being moved outside of litigation, depriving courts of their
precedent-generating function. A related concern is that wrongdoing by parties to arbitration agreements will be shielded from
public view. Reforms to arbitration law could seek to ensure that
courts do not lose these functions by channeling a share of cases
into court, even if they contain otherwise enforceable arbitration
agreements. Although we recognize that this would entail dramatic changes to current law, such a change could be accomplished through amendments to the FAA. A radical possibility
would be to randomize the enforceability of arbitration agreements by sending a small, randomly chosen subset of disputes to
court despite the presence of arbitration agreements.100 This
100 Although randomization in law is rare, it is used. The procedure we describe here
could be analogized to random audits of tax filings by the IRS to ensure compliance. Here,
the goal of randomization is not to deter lawbreaking but to sustain lawmaking.
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would ensure that courts continue to make law in every area of
law, even those for which arbitration agreements are the norm.
This would also ensure that a representative sample of disputes
(that otherwise go to arbitration) become public.
A less radical possibility would be to amend § 10 of the FAA,
which governs the enforcement of arbitral awards. Currently,
§ 10 permits the vacatur of an arbitral award only in the event of
misconduct by the arbitrators or a party or the arbitrators exceeding their authority.101 The bases for vacatur could be broadened,
however, so that those disputes with the greatest public-goods externalities are pulled out of arbitration. An additional basis for
vacatur of an arbitral award could be that the arbitration raised
novel questions of law such that, without a court judgment on the
merits of the claims, those questions of law would remain unanswered but are likely to recur in future in arbitrations.102 Cases in
which an arbitral award is vacated on this ground would then be
litigated. This possibility would occasionally lead to litigation
that duplicates an already-completed arbitration, but this reform
would only affect a small share of arbitrations (given that the vast
majority of arbitrations do not involve novel issues) while protecting the courts’ role in creating precedent.
C. Class Actions and Multidistrict Litigation
In federal court, class actions and MDL are procedural devices for the aggregation of many claims into a single proceeding.
A class action aggregates into a single civil action many claims,
including claims of individuals who never become a party to the
case but are nonetheless bound by the judgment as class members.103 MDL proceedings take already-filed actions (some of
which may themselves be class actions) and transfer them to a
single district court for consolidated pretrial proceedings before a
single judge, even as each action retains its identity as a separate
case.104
Class actions and MDLs have distinct relevance to our analysis
because they both address and create massive externalities for

101

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
The logic of this exception to the enforceability of arbitration agreements would
parallel the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. See, e.g.,
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).
103 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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courts. While aggregative mechanisms help relieve congestion
and bring before the court important cases that would otherwise
not have been pursued (something likely to happen when there is
a widely dispersed harm that is small for each victim but large in
the aggregate),105 they also exacerbate some externalities. As
noted by scholars and judges alike, the accountability of the representative plaintiffs and lawyers to the remaining claimants is
weakened in MDLs and class actions.106 This is a form of strategic
externality that, while intrinsic to the agency relationship between lawyers and their clients, is especially large in class actions
and MDLs.
Given these large sets of externalities, we would predict (as a
positive matter) and hope (as a normative matter) that the rules
governing class actions and MDLs would structure these processes in ways that address the challenges that arise in aggregate
litigation. We address these possibilities below.
1. Strategic externalities.
The heightened risk of strategic externalities in aggregate litigation should lead rule makers and courts to exercise judicial
control to a greater extent.107 This judicial oversight could take
the form of traditional command and control, with judges directing outcomes in the litigation or, perhaps, with the use of the
kinds of innovative tools that we have described. Precisely because of the unusual extent of externalities in this context, we
argue that judges should (and in fact do) innovate with procedural
flexibility to a greater degree in the context of class actions and
MDLs than in any other context. In terms of our cube in Figure 5,
high levels of strategic externalities call for judicial control or regulated markets and prices.

105 If damages vary across potential claimants, it is possible for both effects to occur—
those with higher damages who find it worthwhile to sue congest the courts while those
with lower damages who do not sue forgo creating a benefit shared by all.
106 For a discussion of this issue, see generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel
Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017) (arguing that
class actions in MDLs are more “participatory” in the sense of class members having a
meaningful voice). For a more skeptical view of MDLs relative to class actions on this
front, see Gluck & Burch, supra note 13, at 67–71 (“[MDL judges] focus on attorneys’ MDL
experience, their ability to fund the proceeding, and whether they can ‘play well in the
sandbox’ with others, all of which tend to produce leadership slates of repeat, inside players focused on settlement.”).
107 Because the strategic externalities extend beyond counterparties to unrepresented
claimants, requiring consent between the parties is insufficient to discipline this externality.
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In the class action context, this takes the form of the unique
suite of procedural protections codified in Rule 23. Rule 23 specifies greater judicial oversight of the attorney-claimant relationship than found in any other context in civil litigation. For example, in order to certify a class action, the court must satisfy itself
that the class counsel will “fairly and adequately represent” the
class and even looks into the attorneys’ proposed fee arrangements.108 The Federal Rules nowhere else provide for such an insertion of the judge into attorney representation. Furthermore,
the class action rule is unique in requiring that a settlement involving a class be approved by the judge.109 Indeed, courts reject
settlement when they feel the class attorney sold out the claim for
a hefty fee for herself.110
Based on the reasoning above, we would predict that MDLs
have the same features as class actions in this regard: they would
consolidate counsel in order to reap the benefits to system externalities but then subject the representation process to extraordinary safeguards in order to mitigate strategic externalities. In
this respect, what we observe in practice strongly confirms our
predictions—and not because the rules actually require this! As
noted above, the rules governing judicial oversight of representation, fees, and settlement are unique to class actions and do not
apply to MDLs. Rather, our prediction is confirmed in the most
striking possible way: the statutes and Rules governing MDLs do
not permit these safeguards against system and strategic externalities—but judges use them anyway.111 Lawyers and parties tacitly—even explicitly—endorse this, and appellate courts look the
other way.112 MDL judges themselves say that “the very hallmark
of the MDL is the ability to deviate from traditional procedures.”113
As Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has shown, one divergence from well-established legal rules in MDLs is the capping
of contingent fees. The fee agreement that a lawyer and a client
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). We note that this treatment of class actions is not unique
to the United States. In Israel, the attorney general can object to any class action settlement. Class Actions Law, 5776–2016, SH 2054 264 (Isr.).
110 In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016), the Delaware
Court of Chancery announced that it will no longer lightly approve a class action settlement when the settlement does not include any monetary recovery for the class (the socalled disclosure-only settlements). Id. at 891–92.
111 Burch, supra note 13, at 84–86.
112 See Gluck & Burch, supra note 13, at 20.
113 Gluck, supra note 13, at 1689.
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enter into is generally seen as a private contract.114 Typically,
courts can interfere with private contracts only when there is
some exceptional reason, such as mental infirmity of a party to
the contract.115 Nonetheless, MDL judges have capped attorneys’
contingent fees without any evidence or suggestion of exceptional
reasons. Judges in prominent, closely watched MDLs, including
In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation (Vioxx III),116 In re
Zyprexa,117 and In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Products Liability Litigation,118 capped attorney fees, notwithstanding the absence of any apparent authority to do so.
Similarly, as Professors Andrew Bradt and Teddy Rave have
shown, MDL judges have inserted themselves into settlementagreement processes, even when not authorized to do so. As a
matter of statutory law and the Federal Rules, “no statute or rule
grants MDL judges the power to formally approve or reject a proposed global settlement.”119 Yet sometimes at the invitation of the
parties, and sometimes despite the apparent intentions of the
parties, judges have intervened to approve or disapprove settlements. Parties can reconfigure a mass settlement in an MDL as
a proposed class action settlement, thereby explicitly inviting
(and formally authorizing) judicial review of the settlement.120 In
other cases, MDL settlement agreements contain provisions for
judicial review.121 While the law allows for party rulemaking in this
way, the reality is that the judge is involved as well. High-profile
114

See Burch, supra note 13, at 111–12.
Id.
116 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010). Judge Eldon Fallon in the Vioxx case capped
attorneys’ fees at 32%. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig. (Vioxx II), 574 F. Supp. 2d 607, 617
(E.D. La. 2008). He ultimately allocated 6.5% of that amount to lead lawyers, further reducing nonlead lawyers’ payment. Vioxx III, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
117 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In the Zyprexa case, Judge Jack Weinstein
capped attorneys’ fees at 35%. Id. at 491 (allowing special masters to vary caps upward to
37.5% and downward to 30% in individual cases).
118 MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). In the Guidant case,
Judge Donovan Frank capped all contingent fees at 20%, although he allowed special masters to adjust the fees upward to 33.33%, the contracted-to fee. Id. at *19.
119 Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2017).
120 Id. at 1292.
121 Id. at 1263 (stating that the judges in the Vioxx and Zyprexa litigations—who were
given contractual authority to review the settlement—“sa[id] that MDLs are really ‘quasiclass actions’ that demand formal judicial oversight in order to protect claimants who have
had little involvement in the actual litigation of the aggregated proceeding, but whose
rights may be profoundly affected”); see also Burch, supra note 13, at 118 (arguing that
judicial oversight may improve “the transparency and legitimacy of deals negotiated by selfinterested attorneys that occur[ed] with little client involvement, monitoring, or consent.”).
115

58

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1

examples of this model include the Zyprexa case, where the lawyers “sought and obtained Judge Jack Weinstein’s formal approval of their non-class aggregate settlement”; the Guidant case,
where the lawyers “sought and obtained Judge Donovan Frank’s
approval of their non-class aggregate settlement”; and the Vioxx
case, which was in the same vein but had a more complex structure.122 And in at least one case, a judge reviewed a settlement
without any basis in the parties’ agreement.123
The same pattern appears with respect to representation.
There is no explicit provision in law for the appointment of lead
attorneys in MDLs like there is under Rule 23 for a certified class
action. Yet it is standard practice for the MDL judge to appoint
lead attorneys to serve on behalf of the entire group, and “[t]he
individually retained attorney has no power to appoint or discharge the leaders who assume control of her clients’ cases.”124
MDL judges have then gone on to award attorney fees to lead
counsel, despite lacking what Burch tactfully calls a “unified doctrinal basis” for doing this.125 In authorizing compensating lead
attorneys, judges have “borrowed piecemeal from class actions’
common-fund doctrine, contract principles, ethics, and equity”126
and “cited their ‘inherent managerial authority’ or ‘inherent equitable authority.’”127 As we noted in a prior article, this operates
as a de facto market in legal representation where the power to
allocate litigation resources and procedure (depositions, discovery
requests, even trials) is traded across cases.128 It is market-based
procedural flexibility in everything but name. In the terms of
Figure 5, we are talking about a form of regulated markets where
judges monitor something akin to barter or an implicit cap-andtrade system.
We take no position on the formal question of the extent to
which existing legal authority provides a sufficient foothold for
122 Bradt & Rave, supra note 119, at 1296–97 (first citing In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp.
2d at 490; then citing In re Guidant Corp., 2008 WL 682174, at *15–17; and then citing
Settlement Agreement § 1.2.8.1, In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig. (Vioxx I), MDL No. 1657
(E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007), https://perma.cc/K8H3-5GK4).
123 See id. at 1277 (citing Transcript of Status Conference at 54–64, In re World Trade
Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010), ECF No. 2037).
124 Burch, supra note 13, at 88.
125 Id. at 74.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 105. Judges have also invoked Rule 42, which allows courts to consolidate
actions and “issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay,” in support of the
invocation of managerial or equitable authority. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(3)).
128 Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 938–39.
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these innovations by MDL judges. As a normative matter, we endorse the view that MDL procedure must be unusual because the
MDL process itself creates unusually large strategic externalities
even as it reduces unusually large system externalities.
The specific methods of addressing system and strategic externalities, however, should be open to debate. For example, it is
worth considering whether MDLs should further borrow from
class actions in experimenting with market-based approaches.
Rather than having a judge unilaterally choose class counsel and
evaluate attorney fees, a market-based approach would invite
competition among law firms. One possible method—which some
district courts have employed in class actions—is for the court to
auction off the right to represent the class (and therefore to collect
fees).129 The basic idea is that firms bid by offering the amount of
fees they would charge, and the lowest bidder wins. A challenge
here—and a reason why auctions for class counsel have been criticized—is that while the court can easily determine the lowest bidder, it is not necessarily in the best position to weigh bids against
the quality of the lawyering that each bidder could provide.130
Unique to the MDL context would be market-based solutions
to the disconnect between the lead attorneys—usually organized
as a “Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee” or PSC131—and the individual attorneys and their clients who benefit from the efficiencies of
the MDL process but lose much of their control over their own
claims to the PSC. For example, rather than offering bids to the
court, as in the class action context, law firms vying for a seat on
the PSC could bid for seats by offering to take a smaller cut of the
total fees from individual plaintiffs (and their attorneys). The fact
that bids can be offered directly to plaintiffs and their attorneys
is a distinct advantage of this market-based approach in the MDL
context over the class action context. When a court is assessing
bids, it is difficult for the court to weigh a lower bid on price
against hard-to-quantify factors like lawyer skill. In the MDL
context, the court would not have to make these trade-offs but
rather would allow the individual parties and lawyers to judge for
themselves.
129 See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 78–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(discussing prior cases employing auctions and ordering an auction in the case before it).
The first case to order such an auction was In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 136 F.R.D.
639 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
130 Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 686–87 (2002).
131 Redish & Karaba, supra note 12, at 117–18.
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2. System externalities.
Class actions and MDLs are designed to solve, not create, system externalities. Nonetheless, there may be a need to manage
system externalities here as well. As the saying goes, “build a superhighway, create a traffic jam.”132 Precisely because most decision-making in an MDL is done by a PSC rather than the individual plaintiff or lawyer, it can become cost-effective for a lawyer to
file suit on behalf of a plaintiff with a very weak claim with the
expectation that the claim will be swept up in a mass settlement
in MDL proceedings. This generates a settlement payout with little cost to the plaintiff or lawyer and little risk that the validity
of the individual claim will be tested in court. Such claims, known
as “tag-alongs,” undo some of the benefits of MDLs. Tag-alongs
crowd the MDL judge’s docket and dilute the value of legitimate
claims, both of which are negative spillovers.
As our other work has noted, an approach to combatting congestion like this is the judicial equivalent of toll roads—forcing
parties to internalize the cost they are imposing on others.133 Under current practice, some courts attempt to screen tag-along
cases using orders in the spirit of Lore v. Lone Pine Corp.134 (Lone
Pine orders), through which MDL judges require plaintiffs to
make a prima facie evidentiary showing of injury and exposure to
the defendant’s products or other alleged tortious conduct—and
sometimes even specific causation.135 By raising the cost of piling
into an MDL (more for low-merit claimants than for high-merit
claimants, one hopes), a Lone Pine order regulates the flow of
cases into an MDL the way that a tollbooth controls congestion on
a highway—by charging for entry and not letting slow vehicles
(tractors, horse and carriages, etc.) go on the highway.
But do these orders work as intended? Lone Pine orders impose evidentiary burdens at a stage of litigation—the pleading
stage—where the plaintiff may lack the very evidence that the
order demands.136 If so, then the orders may fail to sort between
low- and high-merit claimants. Rather than regulating the flow
of traffic, so to speak, they may simply block it.

132 This analogy is explored in depth in Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced
Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545, 563–71 (2004).
133 See Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 916–18.
134 No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986).
135 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2019).
136 Id. at 45.
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Our approach suggests the possibility of replacing the figurative toll (the Lone Pine order) with a literal toll imposed on claimants or, perhaps even better, imposed personally on lawyers representing them. As indicated in Figure 5, pleading in MDLs falls
in the zone of regulated markets/prices where judicially regulated
pricing would allow parties to join the MDL as long as they internalize the externalities that they create. This pricing-based solution offers three potential improvements over the Lone Pine order.
First, it does not require plaintiffs to produce evidence that they
do not have. In this way, it better allows sorting between stronger
and weaker claims. Lawyers representing claimants will be more
willing to front the cost for a strong claim than a weak claim; this
is no different than how contingency fee attorneys approach legal
costs in other contexts. Second, rather than potentially and unintentionally erecting a (figurative) blockade to the superhighway,
a (literal) toll can be calibrated up or down to regulate congestion
depending on the needs of the court in any given MDL. And third,
Lone Pine orders impose a deadweight loss—the resources spent
on filings, evidentiary submissions, and fact sheets are used up—
while tolls and fees are merely a transfer of resources. The revenue received by the court could be spent on providing legal services or rebated to the population at large.
3. Public-goods externalities.
Finally, while class actions and MDLs facilitate positive spillovers across claimants, the lead plaintiffs or lead attorneys still
need incentives to bring the actions and make the arguments in
the first place. Further, some aggregate litigation generates publicgoods externalities even beyond the claimants directly affected;
class actions in particular often raise issues of importance to society at large.
This suggests that, at least for actions with societal importance, a subsidy for the cost of fully litigating a class action or
MDL could be appropriate. Under current U.S. law, there is no
explicit subsidy given for litigating important cases, although
perhaps the large compensation earned by the elite class action
bar—which, we should recall, is reviewed and sometimes set by
courts—could be understood as, in part, reflecting an implicit subsidy for positive spillovers. Still, we are not aware of cases where
courts adjust that compensation based on the public or social importance of the cases. Elsewhere, though, the law is explicit. Israeli
law provides a Public Fund to Finance Class Action Lawsuits,
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which by its own terms serves “to aid representing plaintiffs in
financing requests for approval and class actions, which hold a
public and social importance.”137 In terms of Figure 5, the regulators help markets achieve efficiency by providing a subsidy to
cases with large public-goods externalities.
Since class actions often raise issues of social importance,
protective orders, settlements, and other confidentiality agreements that bar information obtained in private litigation from
reaching the public eye should be avoided to protect society from
losing the public-goods externality that class actions generate.
Rule 26(c)(1) allows a court to issue a protective order for “good
cause” to protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”138 The problem is that
shielding the defendant from “embarrassment” often also shields
society from learning important, life-saving information. We
therefore expect that in important cases, such as safety-related
class actions, Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement will be construed narrowly so that important information will reach the public—or at least government agencies. Indeed, both the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission have recently published guidance urging parties and courts to ensure that safety information is disclosed to
government agencies, claiming that they would otherwise violate
the “good cause” requirement of Rule 26(c).139
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we organized existing arguments about procedural design into three strands and showed that each strand is
focused on how procedure can address one type of externality.
The first strand of the literature addresses what we call
“system externalities,” the effects of actions on other cases in the
same court or court system. The second strand addresses what
we call “strategic externalities,” the effects of a party’s actions on
opposing parties in the same case. The third strand implicates

137 Class Actions Law, 5776–2016, SH 2054 264 (Isr.). For discussion of this law, see
Bukspan, supra note 78, at 332–35.
138 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
139 See NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015–01: Recommended Best Practices for Protective Orders and Settlement Agreements in Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg.
13,026, 13,027–28 (Mar. 11, 2016); CPSC Litigation Guidance and Recommended Best
Practices for Protective Orders and Settlement Agreements in Private Civil Litigation, 81
Fed. Reg. 87,023, 87,023 (Dec. 2, 2016).
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external effects on society as a whole, which we call “public-goods
externalities.”
Our framework allows us to identify approaches to procedural design that can address these externalities, whether singly
or in combination. Our focus is on different and sometimes radically new forms of procedural flexibility that tailor procedures
within and across cases. Some of the solutions arising from our
theoretical framework were brought forward in this Article and
include surprising forms of judicial command and control—for example, the Supreme Court prohibiting parties from settling or
withdrawing a pending petition. We explored other ideas in our
earlier work where, among other things, we illustrated specific
examples of regulated markets—including establishing markets
for depositions or appeals.140 It is clear that when we perceive the
dilemmas of civil procedure in terms of externalities, a whole new
world of possibilities opens up—allowing us to provide new solutions for the problems that legal scholars have been debating for
years.
Even more exciting, we believe that allowing this kind of market-based tailoring of legal rules could be extended beyond civil
procedure. In principle, it is not obvious why our arguments could
not also apply in the criminal procedure context.141 Plea bargaining has long been controversial for inducing defendants to trade
away their constitutional and procedural rights. Given that plea
bargaining is here to stay, one could imagine that creating open
markets for procedural rights in this context might increase the
options available to defendants, make trials more viable in some
cases, and better leverage the overtaxed resources of public defenders and state’s attorneys. For example, a rich criminal defendant who wants a jury of twelve rather than six could buy the
right to six jurors from a poor defendant who would use the sale
of such rights to finance his defense in a bench trial.142
The ideas in this Article can apply more broadly to the role of
explicit markets in increasing transparency and access to governmental institutions beyond the courts too.143 For example, lobbyists
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Avraham & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 926–31.
Cf. Ramon Feldbrin, Procedural Categories, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 707, 710 (2021)
(arguing that formal rules of criminal and civil procedure were introduced as recently as
the 1930s and that there are still contexts in Europe in which there is no such divide).
142 Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (holding that a jury of six satisfies
the constitutional right to criminal trial by jury).
143 We thank Sarath Sanga for suggesting this direction of inquiry.
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and constituents gain access to meetings with elected representatives in ways that may be opaque, difficult to navigate, and reliant on anything from large campaign contributions to social networks to expensive meals. Imagine a representative distributing
freely tradable credits for meeting time among all of her constituents or a government agency distributing tradable credits for
hearing time and meeting time.
In such a scenario, would big money still dominate lobbying?
Inevitably, yes—but three things would change: First, powerful
interests would have to compensate regular citizens if the powerful interests are going to monopolize lobbying opportunities. Currently, weak and disorganized groups are shut out of the process
but receive nothing in return. Second, groups that are politically
engaged but lack financial resources could refuse to sell their
credits and pool them instead, thereby gaining access that they
lacked before. Third, the information available to stakeholders
would be (partially) equalized. Everyone could observe the “going
price” for access to decision makers. And it is no rejoinder to say
that this commodifies access to government—does anyone believe
that there isn’t already a “market price” for gaining access to authority, whether judicial, legislative, or executive? Making the
market price a literal rather than figurative reality would make
the process more comprehensible and accessible to the relatively
powerless.
While some literature on these possibilities exists, we leave
all that to another day.

